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INTRODUCTION

The Texas courts are rarely perceived as legislative agencies; instead Texas
courts are generally viewed as forums for adjudicating the rights of parties at
the trial level or interpreting the status of the law at the appellate level.
However, in appropriate circumstances, not only is it proper for the judiciary to assume a legislative role when promulgating court rules,' the Texas
1. See C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION, ACCESS AND ACCOUNTA3-4 (1978)(classification of different types of rules). Court rules may be divided into
three classes including: (1) administrative (court calendars, judicial assignments, meeting
times, and administrative procedures); (2) practice (state bar admission requirements, attorney
BILITY

discipline, judicial conduct, and professional responsibility); and (3) procedure (civil, appellate,
and criminal). Id.; see also C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINE & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING IN
THE STATE COURTS 1-79 (1978)(examination of states' rule-making allocation, authority, process, and challenges); J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULE-
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Constitution demands it.2 Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, 3 there has been a national trend toward shifting the
responsibility for court rule-making power from the state legislatures to their
respective judicial branches, which Texas has joined. 4 A recent rule change
by the Texas Supreme Court5 that repealed a legislatively enacted court procedure 6 presents the question of the conflict of rule-making authority between these two branches of government. 7 The issue to be addressed in this
paper is not the merits of either rule, but which branch of the government
has the final word in the rule-making process.'
In July of 1987, pursuant to Article V, section 31 of the Texas Constitu-

MAKING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3-67 (1973)(state by state
J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 3

analysis of rule-making);
(1977)(history and issues

confronted in rule-making).

2. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31 (state supreme court given authority to prescribe rules of
procedure and practice for proper administration of justice).
3. See Rule Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934)(currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1986)). The federal rules were transmitted in 1937 by an Order of the United
States Supreme Court effective September 16, 1938. See Order of December 20, 1937, 302 U.S.
783 (1937)(Supreme Court adopting rules of procedure by transmitting those rules to Attorney
General who reports rules to Congress); see also J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 67-68 (1977)(statutory history of Rules Enabling Act and events leading to promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938).
4. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation
of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 448-50 (1985)(history of court rule-making patterns a "pendulum" with marked shift to state supreme courts after promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1,4-5 (1958)(advocating court initiative in rulemaking subject to legislative amendment or repeal); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure
Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 7 (1978)(discussing rule-making process in Texas and
delegation of power to Texas Supreme Court).
5. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (current procedural rule regarding frivolous pleadings and
signing of documents effective January 1, 1988).
6. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001 - 9.014 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(originally enacted as Tort Reform Act, ch. 2, § 2.01, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 71-98
(Vernon)(sanctions for frivolous pleadings and claims)). The legislature apparently found former rule 13 inadequate to discourage frivolous suits. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (no reported
cases).
7. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(a) (supreme court shall make rules of civil procedure
consistent with state law); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court
has full rule-making power over practice and procedure concerning civil actions, but promulgated rules cannot enlarge, abridge, or modify substantive rights).
8. See Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices - Frivolous Lawsuits, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988 - RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2, F-10-11 (1987)(postulating Texas

Supreme Court may have final determination in rule-making); Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas
Tort Reform: The Quest For a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25
Hous. L. REV. 59, 354-55 (1988)(supporting legislature as final arbiter of rule-making authority in Texas).
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tion9 and section 22.004(c) of the Texas Government Code,"0 the Texas
Supreme Court amended Rule of Civil Procedure 13.1' In doing so, the

9. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31. The Texas Constitution, article V, section 31 states:
(a) The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial
branch and shall promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the
state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the
various courts.
(b) The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure of all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.
(c) The legislature may delegate to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals the
power to promulgate such other rules as may be prescribed by law or this Constitution,
subject to such limitations and procedures as may be provided by law.
Id. This article is similar to Texas Constitution, article V, section 25 which stated: "The
Supreme Court shall have power to make and establish rules of procedure not inconsistent
with the laws of the State for the government of said court and the other courts of this State to
expedite the dispatch of business therein." See TEx. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1891, repealed
1985). Section 31 differs from old section 25 in that the former grants to the supreme court
full rule-making authority whereas section 25 allowed the supreme court to promulgate rules
only in areas not occupied by legislative enactment. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25, interp.
commentary (Vernon 1955); see also Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading PracticesFrivolous Lawsuits, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL
INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE

1988

-

RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES

F-2, F-10-11

(1987).
10. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(c) (Vernon 1988). Section 22.004 of the Government Code is essentially a rules enabling act similar to the Federal Rules Enabling Act of 1934.
See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); see
generally Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1015-1197
(1982)(exhaustive history of federal statute). The Texas Rules Enabling Act passed in 1939,
recodified in Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated article 1731a, relinquished all rule-making power to the supreme court subject to legislative veto. Act of May 15, 1939, ch. 25, § 1-6,
1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201, 201-03, repealed by, Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 480, § 26(1), 1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 2048, 2048. The recodification of article 173 la to section 22.004 of the Government Code is virtually identical. Id. The pertinent sections of Texas Government Code
Annotated section 22.004 state:
(a) The supreme court has the full rulemaking power in the practice and procedure in
civil actions, except that its rules may not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive
rights of a litigant.
(b) The supreme court from time to time may promulgate a specific rule or rules of civil
procedure, or an amendment or amendments to a specific rule or rules to be effective at
the time the supreme court deems expedient ....
The rules and amendments to rules
remain in effect unless and until disapproved by the legislature ....
(c) So that the supreme court has full rulemaking power in civil actions, a rule adopted
by the supreme court repeals all conflicting laws and parts of laws governing practice and
procedure in civil actions, but substantive law is not repealed ....
TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988).
11. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (amending rule 13); see also Tort Reform Act, ch. 2, § 2.01,
1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 71-98 (Vernon)(codified as amended in TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.001 - 9.014 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). While House Bill 287 died by filibuster in
the first regularly called session of the seventieth legislature, Senate Bill 5 was the phoenix that
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Texas Supreme Court expressly overruled in part chapter nine of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, passed only a month earlier, 12 in which the
Texas Legislature attempted to curtail the perceived problem of frivolous
pleadings. 13
To initially understand the validity of the Supreme Court's action, two
different interpretations of rule-making authority in Texas may be derived
from the constitution and Government Code.' 4 The first gives the supreme
court full rule-making power subject to three conditions: (a) procedural

rules cannot expand or abridge the substantive rights of a litigant;' 5 (b) rules
may be subject to legislative disapproval at some future date;' 6 and (c) rules
cannot conflict with substantive law.' 7 Thus, although the Texas Supreme

Court initiates the rule-making process, 8 the legislature has ultimate ap-

emerged from its ashes. Id.; see also Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest
For a Fairerand More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REV. 59, 80-101
(1988)(legislative history to tort reform process). Following a renewed call by Governor Clements to pass tort reform legislation, Senate Bill 5 was reintroduced by Senator Montford and
eventually passed. Id. at 99-101 (explaining history of Senate Bill 5). The Texas Supreme
Court adopted an objective procedure to determine if sanctions are warranted for frivolous
pleadings, but disregarded the due process protections contained in the legislative version.
Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (judge on own motion or that of party may consider sanctions for
frivolous suit or pleading) with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.011 - 9.012
(Vernon Supp. 1988)(pleading must be "groundless" - no basis in fact or warranted by good
faith argument for extension, modification or reversal - and brought in bad faith to harass or
another improper purpose). A full examination comparing the differences between chapter 9
of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and rule 13 has recently been written by Senator
Montford who was the author of Senate Bill 5. See Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas Tort
Reform: The Quest Fora Fairerand More PredictableTexas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 245, 342-56 (1988)(comparing strengths and weaknesses of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 with Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code Annotation sections 9.001 - 9.014); see
also Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in PleadingPractices- FrivolousLawsuits, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988
RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2, F-10-11 (1987)(differences between chapter 9
Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code and Rule 13).
12. See Tort Reform Act, ch. 2, § 2.01, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 71-98
(Vernon)(codified as amended in Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code Annotated sections
9.001 through 9.014).
13. Id. The thrust of the legislature's tort reform, which encompassed a provision for
frivolous pleadings and claims, included findings of: (1) a "liability insurance crisis" currently
existing in Texas; (2) adversely affecting its citizens and cities, counties, schools districts, professionals - especially physicians, charities, day care centers, business and industries; and (3)
a lack of predictability in the Texas judicial system. Id. at 71-73.
14. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31 (rule-making power vested in supreme court); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Rule Making Act granting supreme court power to promulgate
rules of civil procedure).
15. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (Vernon 1988).
16. Id. at § 22.004(b).
17. Id. at § 22.004(c).
18. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b) (supreme court has responsibility to pass rules of
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proval.' 9 The second interpretation20 shares the identical requirements of
the first interpretation2" but holds when a new rule meets the above requirecivil procedure for all Texas courts not inconsistent with state law); TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.004(a) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court has full rule-making power over procedure and
practice in civil matters).
19. See TEx. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(c). Article V, section 3 1(c) of the constitution states:
"The legislature may delegate to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals the power
to promulgate such other rules as may be prescribed by law or this Constitution, subject to
such limitations and procedures as may be provided by law." Id.; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(rules and amendments effective until disapproved by legislature). The constitution indicates that rule-making power rests with the legislative branch and
is only delegated to the supreme court. See id.
20. See Newton & Wicker, PersonalJurisdiction and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 557-59 n.393 (1986)(test for valid court made rule is
compliance with Rule Making Act, not if court rule conflicts with other legislative law). The
view of Dean Newton shifts the focus from confrontation between a rule promulgated by the
supreme court and a statute passed by the legislature to compliance with the requirements of
the Rule Enabling Act. See id. at 557 n.393. Newton's analysis essentially places final rulemaking power in the supreme court. Id.
21. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.004(a)-(c) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court rules
cannot expand or reduce substantive rights, are subject to legislative disapproval and cannot
conflict with substantive law). The difficult phrase is section (a) which disallows procedural
rule-making to expand, abridge or modify substantive rights. See Rothe v. Ford Motor Co.,
531 F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1981)(Texas Rule of Procedure 4 cannot enlarge substantive
rights of plaintiff by extending legislature's prior determination of statute of limitation); Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. Sanderson, 739 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no
writ)(purpose of rules of procedure explained in Texas Rule of Procedure 1).Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 1 states that "[the proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a
just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law." TEX.R. Civ. P. 1. Besides stating that there is a distinction to be
made between rules of procedure and substantive law, Texas case law is not definitive on the
subject. See Volvo Petroleum, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 717 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)(evidence necessary to establish prima facie case for sworn account under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 185 is procedural matter, not substantive);
Purolator Armored, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 662 S.W.2d 700, 702 n.4 (Tex. App.Austin 1983, no writ)(rules of civil procedure are irrelevant to proceedings reviewing final
orders of administrative agencies); King v. Dupuis, 649 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, no writ)(Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108 cannot lengthen Texas' long-arm jurisdiction
statute). Commentators who have addressed the differences between substantive and procedural law make clear that simplified definitions are at best misleading. See, e.g., Browde &
Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The
Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 444-46 (1985)(New Mexico's exclusive
judicial power over procedural rules renders substance/procedure debate outcome determinative); Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of
Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 451-53 (1985)(while exact definitions are impossible to create
or maintain, effort to delineate between substantive and procedural law serves to keep sharp
focus on rule-making); Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. REs. 16, 35 (1978)(meanings of substance and
procedure shift according to context); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-24 (1958)(fail-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [], No. 1, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:139

ments of the Rule Making Act, legislative review is superfluous because the
requirements stated by the legislature for valid rule enactment have been
met.2 2 While this view does not outwardly challenge the Texas Legislature's
ultimate power over rule-making, it subtly shifts final review to the supreme

court upon meeting the legislative criteria.2 3 Despite the fact that legislative
review may be unnecessary if the second view is adhered to, the rule may
still be challenged if the first view is followed.2 4 In the latter scenario, it is
clear that a potential perpetual circle consisting of the promulgation of a
supreme court rule, repeal by the legislature, renewal of the supreme court
rule and subsequent disapproval by the legislature cannot be allowed.2" This

ure to delegate rule-making power to supreme court is not because judges will enact substantive rules but substantive law and procedure inextricably interwoven); Peterson, Rule-Making
in Colorado:An Unheralded Crisis in ProceduralReform, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 160-61
(1966)(definition of procedure and substance useless without examining underlying reasons
beneath concepts of separation of powers and balance of powers between branches of government). In understanding the underlying reasons beneath the separation of powers, an understanding of procedure as inextricably interwoven with substantive law develops. See Peterson,
Rule-Making in Colorado:An Unheralded Crisis in ProceduralReform, 38 U. COLO. L. REV.
137, 154 (1966)(understanding underlying concepts of separation of powers necessary for understanding distinction between procedure and evidence). Simple definitional statements of
procedure as "affecting court room proceedings" or "that which pertains to and prescribes the
practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which substantive law is determined or made
effective" contrasted with definitions of substance as "effecting primary activity" or "that
which creates duties, rights and obligations" alienate an understanding of rule-making authority between the legislature and court. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the
JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M.L.
REv. 407, 444 n.4 (1985)(discussing definitions of substance and procedure); Gallant, Judicial
Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L.
REV. 447, 452 (1985)(discussing definitions of substance and procedure).
22. See Newton & Wicker, PersonalJurisdiction and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 557-58 (1986)(changes focus from conflict between
rule and previously enacted statutes to compliance with requirements of Rule Making Act).
A supreme court rule which complies with the requirements of the Rule Making Act renders
the rule unnecessary for review because the requirements set forth by the legislature have been
met. See id. at 557 n.393; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988)(legislative
requirements of procedural rules must be met).
23. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988)(legislative test prohibits court
promulgated rule to abridge, modify or enlarge substantive rights of litigants or to effect substantive law).
24. See Newton & Wicker, PersonalJurisdiction and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 557-58 n.393 (1986)(if second view not adopted,
court rules tested for conflict with previously enacted statutes).
25. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408 (N.J.)(because ultimate rule-making authority rests with New Jersey supreme court legislature cannot subsequently pass statute(s) to
overrule promulgated rules by supreme court), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Levin &
Amsterdam, Legislative ControlOver JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1958)(cyclical pattern of legislative veto, court promulga-
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pattern defeats the objectives of both branches of government 2 6 and leaves
the trial practitioner without any measure of predictability as to the applicable court rule which may ultimately affect the outcome of his lawsuit. Conversely, because substantive rights or public policy decisions are often
expressed in procedural rules,27 the supreme courts of states, who have declared their rule-making power unreviewable, 2" have disenfranchised the legislatures' power to influence the rule-making process and ultimately settle
procedural disputes.
After exploring the history of rule-making, this comment will examine
reasons that support judicial and legislative rule-making and show on balance that the current Texas constitutional and statutory framework which
shares rule-making power between these two branches is to be favored over
alternative resolutions which vest rule-making power exclusively in either.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RULE-MAKING POWER

Rule-making in England and the United States
Primary responsibility for rule-making has frequently shifted between the

tion, new promulgation of rule and further legislative veto rejected in New Jersey as
intolerable).
26. See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 (June 22, 1988)
(Spears, J., concurring)(court must ferociously shield its ability to adjudicate independently
and fairly); Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 558, 62 S.W.2d 641, 644 (1933)(judiciary's power
is to decide and pronounce judgments between adverse parties and carry those judgments into
effect); TEX. CONST. art V, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(role of judiciary in Texas is
to adjudicate disputes among litigants); see also Government Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones,
368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. 1963)(power of legislature is plenary limited only by express or
implied constitutional restrictions); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon
195 5)(legislature's primary function is to formulate state policy).
27. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the JudicialRule-Making Power
in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 462 (1985)(unilateral rule-making by judiciary incorrect because not supported in history, destabilizes ability to
function as independent branch of government and encourages conflict with legislature); Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38
OKLA. L. REV. 447, 461-62 (1985)(since substance and procedure are so intertwined there is
inevitable abuse of rule-making power that encroaches on legislature's right to make substantive law); Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisal
of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REv. 234, 251 (1951)(state trend is to vest comprehensive rule-making in courts with legislatures accountable for rules in final analysis); Kay, The
Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 42
(1975)(when judicial rule-making power is beyond review there exists risk of abuse of power).
28. See, e.g., State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974)(Connecticut supreme
court declared exclusive inherent rule-making authority in itself based on separation of powers
doctrine); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (N.M. 1975)(New Mexico
supreme court has exclusive control over rule-making governing procedure or practice as matter of constitutional compulsion); Winberry, 74 A.2d at 414 (New Jersey supreme court has
exclusive non-reviewable rule-making power in matters regarding procedure and practice).
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legislature and the judiciary since the 1700's."2

In the eighteenth century,

the courts in both America and England controlled the design of judicial
process.30 The courts of this period established a highly technical system of
pleading based on the common law "forms of action."'' s This formalistic
approach was criticized as an impediment to justice3 2 and set the stage for
judicial reform by legislatures in each country. 3
In the United States, Congress chose to delegate rule-making power to the
Supreme Court in 1789, avoiding problems state courts would later experience.3 4 Among the states, however, legislatures intervened to simplify the
rule-making process by enacting sweeping changes.3" Unfortunately, legisla29. See Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 31,
40 (1982)(history of court rules operates in cyclical fashion).
30. See E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO
THE END OF THE YEAR 1919, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1922)(prescribing rules of practice was judicial
function before 19th century).
31. See Peterson, Rule-Making in Colorado: An UnheraldedCrisis in ProceduralReform,
38 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 138 (1966)(common law pleadings formed over centuries created
complex procedural rules); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 5 (1978)(English procedure became notoriously complex by 19th century). See
generally F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, 295-386

(1909)(collection of seven lectures on common law forms of action).
32. See Peterson, Rule-Making in Colorado: An UnheraldedCrisis in ProceduralReform,
38 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 138 (1966)(formalism impeded administration of justice as much as
expediting it).
33. See id. (rigidity of court rules impeded wholesale legislative intervention in field of
procedure and practice in United States and England); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 5 (1978)(Parliament took initiative to alleviate
complexity of court rules).
34. See Process Act of Sept. 20, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 STAT. 93-94 (Act regulating courts of
United States giving Supreme Court power over forms and mode of pleadings); see also J.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 55-60 (1977)(origins of rule-

making power of federal courts). Weinstein notes, however, that Congress had to prod the
Supreme Court to use its rule-making power to reform or adopt rules at times. J. WEINSTEIN,
REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 65 (1977). When the Court would not act

on its own, Congress enacted procedural rules such as Process Acts. Id.
35. See Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 31,

41 (1982)(dissatisfaction with technicalities regarding forms of action led to legislative reform
movements and enactment of procedural rules). The first attempt at legislative reform by a
state legislature was the Field Code promulgated in New York and copied by other jurisdictions. Id. (one state's statutory attempt to simplify common law forms of action subsequently
adopted by 24 states by 1885). Dean Pound listed several reasons for legislative reaction to
court rule-making including: (1) needless formality of the 18th century in combination with a
conservative judiciary; (2) complacency with common law writ system by bar and judiciary;
(3) courts had no other model or experience for rule-making procedure other than that already
copied from Europe; and (4) American apprentice system bred a parochialism resisting
change. See Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 599-601 (1926).
Texas avoided the negative effects of the Field Code by rejecting the common law form of
pleading and practice eight years prior to its promulgation due to the influence of Spanish law.
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tive reform of judicial procedure itself became the problem to be corrected
due to the minute detail subsequently added to the original simplistic statutory codes.36 Compounding this complexity was legislative resistance to
change, inexperience in technical judicial procedure, and susceptibility to
political whim which defeated meaningful reform.37
This legislative stagnation was fertile ground for commentators to advocate a return of rule-making power to the courts.3 8 On the federal level, a
See McDonald, The Background of the Texas ProceduralRules, 19 TEX. L. REV. 229, 238-39
(1941)(rejection of common law forms of pleading); see also Butte, Early Development of Law
and Equity in Texas, 26 YALE L.J. 699, 701-02 (1917)(after accepting English common law as
"the rule of decision," Texas' legislature modified common law by introducing Spanish community system of marital property rights and abolishing common law rules of assignment of
choses in action). In fact, Texas was the first state controlled by common law principles to
reject the distinction between law and equity in its courts. See Underwood v. Parrott, 2 Tex.
168, 178 (1847)(proceedings "in all civil suits" in Texas having their origin in common law or
chancery courts shall be conducted by petition and answer); McDonald, The Background of
the Texas ProceduralRules, 19 TEX. L. REV. 229, 239 (1941)(rejecting distinction between law
and equity in Texas courts); Texas Bar Association, The Blending of Law and Equity, 30 AM.
L. REV. 813, 819 (1896)(J. Wheeler's opinion in Underwood v. Parrott,2 Tex. 168, 178 (1847),
makes clear that Texas rejected English distinction between law and equity in pleading and
practice). The rejection of this distinction in Texas courts was committed to the Texas
Constitution.
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction ... of all suits, complaints and pleas
whatever, without regard to any distinction between law and equity, when the matter
shall be valued at, or amount to one hundred dollars, exclusive of interest; and the said
courts or the Judges thereof, shall have power to issue writs necessary to enforce their
own jurisdiction and [to] give them general superintendence and control over inferior
jurisdictions...
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (1845).
36. See McDonald, The Background of the Texas ProceduralRules, 19 TEX. L. REV. 229,
249 (1941)(plethora of amendments to Field Code defeated its original purpose to simplify
common law forms of action). The New York Legislature misunderstood its role in the rulemaking process producing 541 amendments over 25 years to the original 400 proclaimed in
1848. Id. The 1877 New York Code with 1496 sections later grew to an astounding 3400
sections. Id.; see also Peterson, Rule-Making in Colorado: An UnheraldedCrisisin Procedural
Reform, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 137, 139 (1966)(legislative codes were extremely detailed leaving
little room for adaption to unique cases).
37. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study of JudicialRule-Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623, 642 (1956)(procedural statutes result in injustice due to their
rigidity); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958)(arguments favoring judicial rulemaking caused by legislative incompetence in promulgating rules and influences of legislators
pet projects).
38. See Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 600-1 (1926)(advantages of regulating procedure by court rule). Dean Pound makes a historical argument that
procedural rule-making has always been a judicial function as seen from English history. Id.
at 601; see also Pound, Regulating ProceduralDetails by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. March
1927, Part II at 12-13 (court experience, legislature's disinterest, outside influence on legislators promote vesting rule-making power in courts). Dean Wigmore was the second major
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cumulative effort39 influenced Congress to pass legislation that empowered

the United States Supreme Court to establish uniform rules of civil procedure.' The success of those rules and the continued effort of the American
Bar Association has influenced several states to mirror the federal process by
establishing rule-making authority in state courts. 4' Among the states, however, both the current lack of uniformity in the methods used to create rules
of procedure and experiences with nonreviewable judicial rule-making have
raised the question whether the courts or legislatures are best suited as the
primary source of procedural rule-making.
B.

2

Judicial Versus Legislative Rule-Making

A basic understanding of the positive and negative elements inherent in
the rule-making process is necessary to critically evaluate the proper place-

force in advocating that the judiciary should be the sole source for procedural rule-making.
See Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for JudicialProcedureAre Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L.
REV. 276, 276-79 (1928)(logic and policy considerations dictate that rules of procedure can
only be promulgated by judiciary).

39. See Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U.

PUGET SOUND

L.

REV.

31,

41-42 (1982)(American Bar Association, American Judicature Society, and National Municipal league created impetus for new reform movement for court to share rule-making power
with legislature).
40. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 STAT. 1064 (Rules Enabling Act); see
also J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 67-68 (1977)(tracing
statutory history of Rules Enabling Act and initial sequence of events leading to promulgation
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938).
41. See J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKE, A STUDY OF PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 65-67 (1973)(listing different forms rule-making takes among
the states). The various forms include: (1) legislative dominance over rule-making by statute;
(2) full control over rule-making by supreme court; (3) supreme court initiation subject to
legislative veto or revision; and (4) rule-making entrusted to conference or councils. Id.
42. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958)(terms which rule-making best
entrusted to courts or legislative veto answered after probing advantages/disadvantages); Pope
& McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 11 (1978)(raising
question which branch is best suited for rule-making); see also Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential
Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 410-11 (1985)(following supreme court's pronouncement of
nonreviewable rule-making power New Mexico Legislature sought to overturn decision by
constitutional amendment placing final power to determine what was "procedural" in legislature); Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of
Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV.447, 462 (1985)(nonreviewable judicial rule-making power shows
tendency of courts to expand meaning of "procedural rules" beyond reasonable limits encroaching on legislatures power over substantive law); Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and
Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN L. REV. 1, 34 (1975)(Connecticut supreme court
must justify its nonreviewable rule-making power by showing necessity of complete and total
legislative withdrawal from rule-making arena).
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ment of ultimate rule-making power.4 3 Reasons advanced supporting judicial rule-making power include: (1) judicial immunity from political
pressures;' (2) judicial interest, expertise, and familiarity with procedural

43. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1958)(any constitutional scheme accepting judicial rule-making must weigh positive and negative elements inherently involved in
rule-making). Several commentators have already voiced opinions on this topic. See, e.g.,
Browde & Occhialino, Separationof Powers and the JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints,15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 462-73 (1985)(judiciary should
have final rule-making power but adopt prudential constraints to reduce tension between it and
legislature); Clark & Wright, The JudicialCouncil and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346, 362-64 (1950)(advocating rule-making power to be vested
in supreme court to relieve bar from legislative inaction); Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power
of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676-77 (1975)(United
States Supreme Court lost public's confidence by neglecting rule-making power); Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA.
L. REV. 447, 474-82 (1985)(supreme court rule-making power should be subject to legislative
review); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making,
55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 654 (1957)(courts must have rule-making power to effectively promote
justice but must show interest and bear responsibility of actions); Kay, The Rule-Making Authorityand Separationof Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 33-43 (1975)(judiciary has
failed to exercise restraint of power in asserting exclusive control over procedural rule-making
necessitating legislative review); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial RuleMaking: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37-42 (1958)(advocating
shared power in rule-making); Means, The Power to Regulate Practiceand Procedurein Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 442, 442-44 (1980)(Florida's supreme court wrongfully foreclosed legislature from rightful role in determining questions of policy inherent in court
procedures); Parness, The Legislative Roles in Florida'sJudicialRulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L.
REV. 359, 360 (1981)(Florida supreme court's exclusive rule-making power does not mean
legislature cannot assert voice in resolving policy issues within procedural rules); Spitzer,
Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 31, 64-73 (1982)(court
rule-making too important to be left to courts alone); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules For Judicial Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278-79 (1928)(any legislative
intervention into court's domain to promulgate rules of procedure constitutionally void).
44. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1958)(legislators subject to pressures other
than motives for efficient administration of justice); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure
Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 7 (1978)(efficiency of procedural rules lost when diluted
by political compromise); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 28, 44-45 (1952)(improper motive such as key legislator's ill-advised pet project or disgruntled lawyer seeking rule change after losing case on procedural gap intolerable); Wigmore,
All Legislative Rulesfor JudicialProcedureare Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278
(1928)(judiciary is disinterested body). But see Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of Judges: The
Michigan Case, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, 23, 23-24 (partisan elections at odds
with impartiality, alienates best qualified candidates and undermines confidence in judiciary);
Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular
JudicialElections, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, 31, 36-37 (elections force judges to
bow to temporary public whim rather than protecting enduring legal principles which is antithetical to judicial independence from social, economic or political pressures); Krivosha, Ac-
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problems;4 (3) avoidance of legislative delay to enact needed procedural
changes;46 (4) public expectation of judicial accountability for the efficient
administration of justice;4 7 (5) willingness to constantly review procedural
methods;4" (6) ability to make minor changes in individual rules without
embarking on wholesale procedural or judicial reform;4 9 (7) less cumbersome enactment process;" 8) decreased litigation resulting from application
of court-made rules over legislative codes because of legislative inability to
clarify ambiguity once rules are promulgated" and; (9) consistent interpre-

quiringJudges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting Such a Method, 40 Sw.
L.J. (Special Issue) May, 1986, 15, 19-20 (partisan elections forcing judges to solicit and accept
campaign contributions creates appearance of impropriety and forces identification with special interest groups while alienating notion of impartiality); Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's
ConstitutionalRight to a Fairand ImpartialForum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties
Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributionsfrom Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 385-86
(1987)(prior political campaign contributions by attorney to judge may deprive opposing party
of impartial forum under due process clause).
45. See Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for JudicialProcedure are Void Constitutionally,
23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278 (1928)(judiciary aware of needs of trial lawyers due to experience as
practitioners). Wigmore also unequivocally shows his disdain for the inferior knowledge of the
legislature in the rule-making process. See id. The most qualified group in the legislature for
rule-making, the judiciary committee, does not necessarily have the most qualified personnel
on it. Further, lawyers on that committee are not necessarily the most knowledgeable of procedure. Id.
46. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV.1, 10 (1958)(even procedures of paramount
importance are long delayed due to legislatures slow response time); Wigmore, All Legislative
Rules for Judicial Procedureare Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278 (1928)(current
political pressures and slow moving machinery cause infrequent and inconsistent legislative
amendment to procedural rules).
47. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study of JudicialRule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 643 (1956)(courts responsible for administration of justice); Levin
& Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958)(legislature does not perceive need to review procedural methods).
48. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study of JudicialRule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 643 (1956)(courts exercising rule-making power periodically review rules to eliminate inequalities).
49. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1958)(maintaining court procedure best
effected by courts with uncomplicated machinery); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in
New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 28-29 (1952)(rule changes can be made periodically as
needed by courts whereas legislative change infrequent and complicated).
50. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in
ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1958)(court rules flexible in application,
easy to clarify and amend where legislative change difficult due to short, busy, infrequent
sessions).
51. See Joiner & Miller, Rules ofPracticeand Procedure: A Study of JudicialRule Mak-
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tation of rules by the same body who created them.5 2
In opposition, arguments advanced favoring legislative rule-making include: (1) judicial resistance to change;5 3 (2) judges' bias favoring their own
preferences;54 (3) judges who are out of touch with the needs of litigants and
members of the bar;55 (4) the perception that the legislature better reflects
the public will; 56 and (5) concern that judicial rule-making will restrict or
create substantive rights."
Although the Texas Supreme Court currently promulgates rules subject to
legislative disapproval, examination of how history has shaped the positions
of these two branches of government is necessary to make an informed
choice whether the current alignment of power is correct.
C. FactorsSignificant to Texas Rule-Making
There are three factors essential to an understanding of the history of rule-

ing, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 643 (1956)(courts with rule-making authority have fewer cases
turning on procedural questions whereas legislative codes tend to foster litigation).
52. See id. at 644 (consistent interpretation of rules increases when court initiates rulemaking); Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926)(consistency in interpretation increases when judiciary alone in charge of rule-making process).
53. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1958)(judges with rule-making power
have reached age where change difficult); Warner, The Role of Courts and JudicialCouncils in
ProceduralReform, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 441,451 (1937)(some judges too old to accept or initiate change).
54. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Oer JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1958)(judges more likely to yield to own
convenience in procedural matters such as briefs or reducing litigation costs rather than those
of litigants); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 8
(1978)(judges adopt rules suiting own convenience).
55. See Warner, The Role of Courts and JudicialCouncils in ProceduralReform, 85 U.
PA. L. REV. 441, 451 (1937)(judges tenure on appellate bench renders them ex-officio experts
on needs of lower courts).
56. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
7-8 (1978)(legislature primary body reflecting public's will and accountable to populace by
election).
57. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1975)(legislature must have power to review court rules due to potential
for court to enact substantive law through promulgation of procedural rules); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision,
107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1958)(concurrent power over rule-making between legislature
and judiciary decreases potential errors of court enacting substantive law by legislative review
of court rules); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
5, 8-9 (1978)(entanglement of procedure and substantive law demands cooperation between
courts and legislature in rule-making); Spitzer, Court Rule-Making in Washington State, 6 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 31, 58-59 (1982)(legislature as policy making body must be given
opportunity to approve/disapprove court rules that encompass substantive character).
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making in Texas:58 the constitutional creation of an independent judiciary
in Texas which cannot be destroyed by the legislature; 59 a strong tradition of
the separation of powers doctrine derived from the Republic of Texas;6° and
the popular election of supreme court justices.61 The election of judges and
the creation of an independent judiciary are further expressions of the importance and central role of the separation of powers doctrine. 62 These factors distinguish the Texas court system from the federal judiciary and
provide a uniqueness which will effect the ultimate resolution of the rulemaking question in Texas. Although there is a strong argument for
nonreviewability of rule-making based on these three factors and others,63

58. See TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers); id. art. V, § 1 (creation of independent judiciary); id. art. V, § 2 (election of judges). Separation of powers is the foundation for the independent judiciary embodied in article V, section 1, and the election of judges
stated in article V, section 2 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, interp.
commentary (Vernon 1955)(independent judiciary flows from separation of powers doctrine);
id. art. V, § 2, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(elected judiciary reaction to executive's
power to appoint members of court). The independent judiciary and the election of judges are
further embodiments of the separation of powers principle. Id.
59.'See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876, amended 1981)(creation of independent
judiciary).
60. See Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 561, 62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (1933)(legislature's act
allowing advisory opinions in appellate courts found unconstitutional because constitution
alone grants appellate courts their jurisdiction); TEX. CONsT. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers). The exact language currently used in article II, section I is derived from the Constitution
of 1845 which had its roots in the Republic's Constitution of 1836. Compare TEx. CONST. art.
II, § I (1845)(powers of Government "shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy") with TEX. CONST. art 1, § 1

(1836)

("powers of this government shall be divided into three departments ... which shall
remain for ever separate and distinct"). It is noted, however, that daily practice of governmental officials defied these constitutional words. See Paulsen, A Short History of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Texas, 65 TEX. L. REV. 237, 283-84 (1986)(only patriotism of Republic's first Congress and unsettled nature of populace can excuse legislature's abuse of power in
electing justices to supreme court to exclusion of population). Though independent justices
were to run the courts, the appointment practice by joint ballot of Congress clearly reveals at a
minimum a legislative impropriety with the legislature appealing to overly influence the judiciary. Id. at 294.
61. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (election of judges).
62. See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 n.2 (June 22, 1988)
(Spears, J., concurring)(creation and derivation of power in Texas Courts by article V, section
1 of Texas Constitution sets Texas judiciary apart from United States judiciary whereas United
States Constitution merely implies separation of powers); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, interp.
commentary (Vernon 1955)(article V, section 1 of Texas Constitution [creation of courts] is
derivative of separation of powers doctrine); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2, interp. commentary
(Vernon 1955)(1850 amendment to constitution provided for selecting judges by popular election in conjunction with movement for popular sovereignty).
63. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 551 P.2d 1354, 1358-59 (N.M. 1976)(legislative creation of statutory privilege for newsmen invalid encroachment on rule-making power
of supreme court), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 419
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this view is ultimately untenable because of the underlying public policies
that are often enmeshed in the fabric of procedural and administrative
rules. 64

With the exception of the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas, 65

(N.J.)(New Jersey Supreme Court declared rule-making power unreviewable by interpreting
constitutional language "subject to law" in article VI, section 2 equivalent to "substantive law"
eliminating legislature's power to override supreme court rules), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877
(1950). The New Jersey constitutional language on which Winberry was decided stated: "[t]he
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and,
subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts .... N.J. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2, 3. Several other states have adopted rule-making schemes similar to New Jersey's constitutional construction. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (5); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21;
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. VI, §§ 4, 6, 16; MICH.CONST. art. VI,
§§ 3, 5; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 73-A; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; PA. CONST. art. V, § 10; W.
VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 8. In addition to New Mexico, Connecticut's supreme court has
found exclusive rule-making power in itself by reinterpreting article II (distribution of powers)
and article V, section 1 (vesting of power in particular courts) of the Connecticut Constitution.
See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 728-29, 731 (Conn. 1974); see also, Pound, Procedure
Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV.28, 28-29 (1952)(nonreviewable rulemaking power in supreme court important constitutional interpretation leading to improved
judicial administration); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules For JudicialProcedureare Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 276 (1928)(attempts by state legislatures or Congress to
control court proceedings inherently unconstitutional interference with judicial functions).
But see Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of
Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 450 (1985)(Dean Pound's analysis erroneous and leads to
problems despite judge's good faith in promulgating rules); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative
ControlOver JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 37-42 (1958)(legislative review of court rulemaking essential for public policy reasons).
64. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the JudicialRule-Making Power
in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M.L. REV.407, 462-73 (1985)(no
support for unreviewable supreme court rule-making power); Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisalof Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 234, 241-45 (1951)(New Jersey supreme court's promulgation of nonreviewable rulemaking power erroneous constitutional interpretation); Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and
Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975)(legislative exclusion must
be based on legislative incompetence not judicial competence to promulgate rules).
65. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1836). The constitution of the Texas Republic duplicated
the language of article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § I (vesting ofjudicial power in one supreme court and such other courts as congress later
creates). The constitution of the Republic of Texas vested judicial power solely in the supreme
court with further creation of lesser courts left to the legislature to establish. See TEX. CONST.
art. IV, § 1 (1836)(legislature's power to create other courts). The 1836 Constitution, however, laid the framework for the present court system adopted in 1876. Id. Though judicial
power was vested only in the supreme court, article IV, section 1 of the 1836 Constitution
provided for the Republic to be divided into at least three but not more than eight districts,
with a judge sitting in each district so created. This constitution also provided for a county
court in each county as well as justice courts as the legislature should so provide. Id. Each
court created by the Constitution of the Republic of Texas is currently part of the Texas judi-
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the Texas Constitution has always provided for an independent judiciary.6 6
As early as 1877, the supreme court declared that all judicial power of the
state had been vested in the courts created by the state constitution so that
jurisdiction was not subject to change by the legislature except where expressly provided by the constitution.67 Constitutional amendments subsequently allowed the legislature to create new courts, but never to destroy the
jurisdiction of courts already created by the constitution. 68 Because Texas

cial system. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(providing for
supreme, appellate, district, county and justice courts).
66. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1845). Judicial power which had been vested solely in
the supreme court in the Republic of Texas was expanded to include district courts when
statehood was achieved. See id. Though no change was reflected in the Confederate Constitution of 1861, the 1866 constitution adopted for readmittance to the Union added county courts
and corporation courts to those already vested with power from prior constitutions. See TEX.
CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866)(adding county and corporation courts). When the 1866 constitution did not meet the approval of the U.S. Congress, Texas officials who were then in power
were removed by the military government and new officials appointed. Texas was then
readmitted to the Union under the 1869 Constitution. See BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 10 (1976)(readmission of Texas into Union). The 1869
constitution withdrew county and corporation courts from article IV, section 1 and was replaced by the language of the 1861 constitution. Compare TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866,
repealed 1869)(judicial powers vested in one Supreme Court, district courts, county courts,
corporation courts and others as legislature may establish) with TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1
(1869)(judicial power vested in one Supreme Court, district courts and such courts created by
legislature or 1869 constitution). Finally, the 1869 constitution was superseded by the constitution of 1876 which stated: "The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, in a Court of Appeals, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioners' Courts,
in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other courts as may be established by law ......

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
67. See Ex parte Towles, 48 Tex. 413, 439 (1877)(framers intended to form complete and
permanent judicial system not subject to change by legislature except where constitutionally
stated); Coombs v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 648, 663, 44 S.W. 854, 861-62 (1898)(where constitution vests judicial power in courts, legislature has no right to invade court system unless specifically authorized by constitution). Coombs specifically made clear that "the legislature has no
authority to change the organization of the judicial system, nor can that body, under the guise
of creating 'other courts,' divest the district court or the justices of the peace courts of their
constitutional jurisdiction." See Coombs, 38 Tex. Crim. at 663, 44 S.W. at 861-62. Though
the legislature has had the power to create other courts as it deems necessary since 1845, it has
never had authority to destroy the jurisdiction of constitutionally created courts because judicial power "has been distributed by the organic law, and is beyond legislative control." Id. at
663, 44 S.W. at 862.
68. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876, amended 1891). The major addition to article V,
section 1 of the 1876 constitution was the creation of a court of criminal appeals. See TEX.
CONT. art. V, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(outstanding feature of judiciary article
was creation of appellate criminal court). The 1891 revision of this article further allowed the
legislature to create courts it deemed necessary and to conform the jurisdiction of the constitutional district and inferior courts to those courts it may create. That section states: "The
Legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and prescribe the juris-
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courts are not "dependent" on a legislative grant of power for their existence
or jurisdiction like the federal courts but share power equally with the legislative and executive branches, the independent nature of the judiciary is one
factor to be considered in determining which branch
of government should
69
have the final word in procedural rule-making.
The meaning attributed to the separation of powers principle has remained essentially unchanged since the Constitution of the Republic of
Texas in 1836. 70 This doctrine makes explicit the need to avoid centralization of power in any governmental branch. 7 The formation of the Texas
judiciary is an outgrowth of the desire to establish in each branch of government the power to carry out its constitutionally delegated functions. 2 This
desire for independence is embodied in the Texas Constitution which provides that "no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others,
except in the instances herein expressly permitted." 73 This provision embodies the Texas separation of powers doctrine, yet implicitly recognizes the
need for flexibility in an area such as rule-making which characteristically is
legislative in nature.74

diction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other

inferior courts thereto." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876, amended 1891).
69. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986)(judiciary is constitutionally
established equal and separate branch of government). Compare TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1
(independent judiciary) and TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(role
of judiciary in Texas) with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (judicial power vested in one supreme
court and other courts Congress may establish) and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (jurisdiction
of federal courts).
70. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1836) (powers of government are divided between
executive, legislative and judicial "remaining forever separate and distinct") with TEX. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (no one department of government shall exercise power attached to another except
as expressly provided by constitution). See generallyJ. SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS 155-603 (3d ed. 1888)(collection of all Texas constitutions). The current
wording of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in article II, section 1 has appeared in
all prior Texas Constitutions. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon
1955)(exact wording of article II, section 1 incorporated in all state constitutions).
71. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)(fear of power in
centralized group influenced creation of doctrine).
72. See Houston Tap & Brazoria Ry. Co. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317, 335-36 (1859)(article
II, section 1 contemplates employees of each branch competent to discharge constitutional
duties without aid or interference from employees of another branch); Lytle v. Halff & Bro., 75
Tex. 128, 132-33, 12 S.W. 610, 611 (1889)(three branches shall co-exist without encroaching,
destroying or restricting another).
73. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
74. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)(practical necessities
require constitution to grant to each branch certain powers which do not characteristically
belong to it). One example where the supreme court utilizes a natural legislative function is
rule-making. Id.
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The election of supreme court justices is another outgrowth of the separation of powers principle." With the advent of statehood in 1845,76 Texas
initially utilized a system of appointment in selecting its supreme court
judges which was modeled after the United States Constitution.7 7 An 1850
79
amendment 78 changed the system of appointment to one of popular vote.
Except for a short return to a system of gubernatorial appointment, s° judicial elections have been the norm since 1876.81 The impetus to return to
elected judicial officials followed a period of political abuse when the gover-

75. See TEx. CONST. art. V, § 2 (currently voters elect three of nine supreme court justices every two years for a six year term).
76. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1836)(election of judges). The first Texas constitution
provided that all judges would be elected by joint ballot of the Senate and House. Id.
77. Compare TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1845)(governor nominates and with advice and
consent of two-thirds of senate appoints judges of supreme and district courts) with U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (president nominates and with advice and consent of senate appoints
supreme court justices).
78. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1845, amended 1850)(judges and other named officials
elected by voters when terms of office completed or vacated); J. SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 134, 222 (3d ed. 1888)(1850 amendment provided for election of

judges and certain other officials). See generally Comment, Selection and Discipline of State
Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 672, 676 (1977)(discussing historical influences on judicial
elections in Texas).
79. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1845, amended 1850)(expiration of judicial term will be
filled by election of State voters); Mullinax, Judicial Revision - An Argument Against the
Merit Plan of JudicialSelection and Tenure, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 21, 21-22 (1973)(dissatisfaction with federal method of judicial appointment led to popular election of judges); Comment, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 672, 676
(1977)(substitution of voter choice over gubernatorial selection influenced by popular sovereignty ideals of Jacksonian Democratic Movement). One populist ideal promoted by the Jacksonian Democratic Movement was rejection of the federal method of selecting judges by
presidential appointment. See Comment, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14
Hous. L. REV. 672, 676-77 (1977)(Jacksonian influence on election of judges).
80. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1869)(supreme court justices appointed by governor
with advice and consent of senate to nine year terms between 1867-1875). The system of
appointed judges was prominent during the period of reconstruction. See Norvell, Oran M,
Roberts and the Semicolon Court, 37 TEX. L. REV. 279, 281-84 (1958)(supreme court justices
appointed by Governor with advice and consent of senate for nine year terms); see also TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 2, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(constitution of 1869 allowed appointment of supreme court justices by governor with senate approval).
81. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1876, amended 1980)(supreme court justices elected at
general election for 6 year term). The 1876 and 1980 articles are substantially the same, differing only in details which include: the number of justices comprising the court; what constitutes
a quorum; requirements to run as justice of the supreme court; and salary. Compare TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 2 (1876, amended 1908)(three justices comprise supreme court, two constitute quorum, and must be thirty years old practicing or acting as judge for seven years to run)
with TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1876, as amended 1980)(nine justices on court, five constitute a
quorum, and must be thirty-five years to run and practice ten years as a lawyer or judge).
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nor appointed members of the supreme court.8 2 Returning power to the
voters to elect judges dispelled the fear of concentrated power in one branch
of government."3 This background of Texas history as embodied in the
separation of powers and an independent, elected judiciary must be utilized
to understand the past and future of rule-making in this state.
D. Rule-Making in Texas
Rule-making in Texas may roughly be divided into three periods.8 4 The
first occurred between 1876 and 1891 when the supreme court had sole authority to promulgate procedural rules for Texas courts.8 5 Although all
Texas constitutions prior to 1876 provided the supreme court with power to
make procedural rules,8 6 the court had failed to take control of the rulemaking process.8 7 An 1876 constitutional amendment, however, consolidated the court's power enabling it to pass rules of substantial scope in 1877
for all state courts.8" Although critics argued that the 1877 procedural en-

82. See M. BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 29
(1976)(following Texas' rejection of being readmitted into Union following Civil War, General
Sheridan replaced all state officials with own appointees); Norvell, Oran M, Roberts and the
Semicolon Court, 37 TEX. L. REv. 279, 279-303 (1959)(reconstruction court and Ex parte
Rodriguez allowed Governor Davis to continue in office despite end of legal term).
83. See Mullinax, JudicialRevision - An Argument Against the Merit Plan for Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 21, 33-34 (1973)(elected judiciary upholds court's
credibility, promotes judicial accountability, and protects people from appointed justices with
life tenure and despotic power). Id. Currently, there are 11 states with partisan elections, 13
with non-partisan elections and 27 states with judges appointed by the governor on advice and
consent of the senate. See San Antonio Express News, January 29, 1988, at D-l, col. 2.
84. See Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices - Frivolous Lawsuits, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988 - RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2, F-10-11 (1987)(three periods

emerge granting supreme court power to promulgate rules from constitution).
85. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(court of 1876 recognized rule-making power of supreme court).
86. M. BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY
41(1976)(supreme court could not pass rules of procedure inconsistent with "the laws" prior to
1876 thus hampering serious rule-making); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule
Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 9 (1978)(constitutions before 1876 empowered supreme court
to make rules not inconsistent with laws of legislature). Until 1876, the prior constitutions
made no mention of rule-making authority other than mentioning that trials shall be conducted according to "rules and regulations prescribed by law." W. HARRIS, RULES OF THE
COURTS 7 (2d ed. 1921).
87. See M. BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 41
(1976)(even when constitution of 1876 omitted restriction that court rules could not contradict
legislative acts, court adopted only minimal rules); W. HARRIS, RULES OF THE COURTS 7 (2d
ed. 1921)(though supreme court had rule-making power prior to constitution of 1876, no initiative taken to use it).
88. See Order of Supreme Court of Texas, December 1, 1877, 47 Tex. 597, 597-641
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actments invaded the legislative domain,8 9 the rules were nevertheless upheld by the supreme court as a valid exercise of its rule-making authority
pursuant to the 1876 Constitution.90 This assertion of the court's power
went unchallenged until an amendment to article V, section 25 was approved
in the 1891 Constitution,9 1 which began the second period of rule-making in
Texas.
As a result of this constitutional amendment, from 1891 to 1939, the rulemaking power continued to be vested in the supreme court, but only in areas
not occupied by legislative enactment. 92 Adhering to the letter of the 1891
Constitution, the supreme court repeatedly held that when a statutory and
court-made rule conflicted, the statutory rule would control. 93 Despite constitutional authorization to promulgate rules, the supreme court's influence

(1877)(initial promulgation of rules of civil procedure by Texas Supreme Court controlling
trials in supreme and district courts).
89. See Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices - Frivolous Lawsuits, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988 RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2, F-10 (1987)(after extensive rules
promulgated by supreme court in 1876, rules attacked as unconstitutional intrusion into legislative power).
90. See Texas Land Co. v. Williams, 48 Tex. 602, 603-04 (1878)(seminal case stating
supreme court's constitutional power to make rules and regulations for purpose of expedient
judicial transactions intended to remedy prior inadequate rules); see also Poland v. Porter, 44
Tex. Civ. App. 334, 336, 98 S.W. 214, 215 (1906, no writ)(disregard for procedural rules intended to bring uniformity to court system will yield in reversal); Cage v. Tucker's Heirs, 25
Tex. Civ. App. 48, 49, 60 S.W. 579, 580 (1901, no writ)(without compliance to rules court will
not hear appeal because rules intended to simplify questions to appellate courts, not perpetuate
stagnation).
91. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1891, repealed 1985).
92. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(constitutional
amendment in 1891 to article V, section 25 allowed the supreme court to make rules only
where legislature not acted). Article V, section 25 as amended in 1891 reads: "The Supreme
Court shall have power to make and establish rules of procedure not inconsistent with the laws
of the State for the government of said court and the other courts of this State to expedite the
dispatch of business therein." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1891, repealed 1985); see also Pope &
McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 10 (1978)(supreme
court retained rule-making authority subject to legislative enactment).
93. See M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Beasley, 106 Tex. 160, 170, 155 S.W. 183, 187 (1913)(legislative enactment prevails over court rule in conflicting situation); St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co.
v. West Bros., 159 S.W. 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, no writ)(supreme court
cannot set aside statutes by rules); Childress v. Robinson, 161 S.W. 78, 80-81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1913, writ dism'd)(supreme court rules have same force and effect as statutes
except when in conflict with legislative enactment where statute controls); see also Note, Appeal and Error-Application of Rule 62A Since Golden v. Odiorne, 13 TEX. L. REV. 338, 344
(1935)(court must not violate constitutional mandate to promulgate rules inconsistent with
Texas law); Recent Case, Appeal and Error-Motionfor New Trial-Conflictof Court Rule with
Statute, 15 TEX. L. REV. 369, 369-70 (1937)(when statute and court rule conflict, statute
prevails).
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over civil procedure was effectively eliminated.94 During this time frame,
procedural rules were frequently enacted by the legislature with particularity
ultimately creating a procedural morass. 95 The legislature's rules were
rarely codified, 96 sharply criticized,9 7 and highly complex.9 8 Dissatisfaction

with the prevailing rule-making procedures and the inability of the legislature to place the rules into an accessible form ultimately led to a campaign
designed to return rule-making power to the supreme court. 99

94. See McDonald, The Background of the Texas ProceduralRules, 19 TEX. L. REV. 229,
239 (1941)(under 1891 constitutional amendment supreme court's willingness to promulgate
rules waned resulting in lack of liberalism in civil procedure from 1900-1940); Wilson, The
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 TEX. L. REV. 766, 766-67 (195 1)(legislature's involvement
in rule-making effectively eliminated court's efforts in area prior to 1939).
95. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
10 (1978)(Texas procedure became increasingly more complex during legislature's active period of rule-making); Wilson, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 TEX. L. REV. 766, 767
(1951)(stagnation, dissatisfaction and complexity of legislative rule-making for court system
was impetus for investing supreme court with full rule-making power). Judge Combs of the
Beaumont Court of Appeals expressed the frustration with legislative rule-making:
Our courts seem to have lost, in recent years, this ability to do justice except as a mere
incident of following meticulously, an elaborate and increasingly more complicated set of
rules ....
A litigant who ... suffers the remand of his case on such apparently trivial
grounds must regard us as devoid of all sense of right.
Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudd, 102 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937,
no writ)(Combs, J. concurring).
96. See Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices - Frivolous Lawsuits, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988 - RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2, F-10-11 (1987)(rules enacted by

legislature between 1891-1939 confusing and rarely codified to aid trial lawyers).
97. See M. BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 42
(1976)(dissatisfaction with statutory rules led legislature to relinquish rule-making power to
supreme court).
98. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)(piecemeal legislative rule-making over years created technical body of procedural law based on old common
law forms); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 5,
10 (1978)(complexity of Texas procedure during period of increased legislative activity ultimately led to reform).
99. See McDonald, The Background of the Texas ProceduralRules, 19 TEX. L. REV. 229,
239-246 (1941)(reform movement that began in 1905 finally bore fruit with legislature enacting
article 1731a shifting rule-making power to supreme court in 1939). McDonald traces the
national reform movement that returned rule-making power to the courts and shows how
Texas generally followed and was influenced by the same national leaders. Id. For example,
the American Bar Association in 1912 formally began a campaign for the United States Congress to recognize the United States Supreme Court's rule-making power. Id. at 241. In the
same year, the Committee on Judicial Administration of the Texas Bar Association recommended to the Texas Legislature that the Texas Supreme Court be granted similar rule-making
power. See id. at 241-42; see also Texas Bar Association Proceedingsof the Thirty-FirstAnnual
Session, 31 TEX. BAR ASS'N 77, 77-103 (1912)(adoption of Roscoe Pound's recommendation
to shift rule-making power from state legislatures to highest court).
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The third period in Texas rule-making was initiated by the Texas Bar Association and the Texas Civil Justice Council." ° ° The reforms proposed by
these groups induced the 46th Legislature to authorize the supreme court to
promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts in the state. 01 With the
passage of the Rule Making Act, 0 2 Texas joined the national trend to return
rule-making power 3and responsibility for the efficient administration of jus10
tice to the courts.

100. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
10 (1978)(former Chief Justice Pope designates Texas Bar Association, Texas Civil Judicial
Council and Texas Law Review as significant players in shifting rule-making power to supreme
court); Wilson, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,29 TEX. L. REV. 766, 767 (195 1)(names
Texas Bar Association and Texas Advisory Civil Judicial Council significant parties in shifting
rule-making power to supreme court).
101. Act of May 15, 1939, ch. 25, §§ 1-6, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201, 201-03, repealed by,
Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 480, § 26 (1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2048, 2048. Article 1731a as
originally enacted gave the supreme court power to promulgate rules of civil procedure for the
Texas trial courts subject to the legislature's right to reject the drafted rules. See M. BONER, A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 42 (1976)(though legislature has
right to refuse drafted rules by supreme court, never exercised this power); Wilson, The Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure,29 TEX. L. REv. 766, 767 (1951) (rule-making dominance retained by
legislature but never exercised). Additionally, article 1731a repealed all inconsistent statutes
that had procedural effect. See Wilson, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,29 TEX. L. REV.
766, 767 (195 1)(article 1731a repealed all legislative procedural rules effective September 1,
1941). In this regard, 173 la directed the supreme court to provide a list of procedural statutes
that would be superceded by the court's new rules. The entire process of rewriting the civil
rules and creating the list of repealed statutes was to be completed by December 1, 1940 with
the filing of these documents with the Secretary of State. Id. An extended discussion on the
panel appointed to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee and their extensive work is provided by Wilson. Wilson, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 TEX. L. REV. 766, 768-83
(1951).
102. See Rule Making Act, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 568, 568-70 (currently codified in TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988)). The Rule Making Act was originally passed as
H.B. 108 in the 46th Legislature on May 15, 1939, effective that same day. Id.
103. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
10 (1978)(Texas joined nationwide trend delegating rule-making responsibility to courts). The
transition to court rule-making with subsequent legislative review completely renovated civil
procedure in Texas. See id. at 11-12 (advisory committee on rules of civil procedure aiding
supreme court held 51 institutes throughout Texas to explain expansive rule changes and underlying philosophy); see also Wilson, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 TEX. L. REV.
766, 770-71 (1951)(because fight with legislature to regain rule-making control so arduous,
supreme court advisory committee understood role to completely revamp rules of civil procedure to meet expectations of bar and legislature). The advisory committee was divided into
two main subcommittees. See id. at 771. One group was to decipher which statutes were
procedural and recommend further subcommittees that would need to be created. Five separate subcommittee's were actually created to scrutinize the proposed rules. The five groups
included: (1) procedures up to trial; (2) procedures during trial; (3) appellate procedure; (4)
ancillary proceedings (attachment, executions, garnishment, injunctions); and (5) special proceedings (forcible entry and detainer actions, trespass to try title). Id. at 772. The second
group was charged with identifying and enunciating the "policy" of the rule-making process,
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Since the passage of the Rule Making Act in 1939, two modifications to
the documents on which the rule-making process is based have occurred.
First, article 173 la has been recodified into the Texas Government Code. 104
While recodification has not substantively changed the supreme court's
prominence over rule-making,10 5 the legislature's continued delegation of
rule-making power to the supreme court implies that it has plenary power
over the rule-making process. 106 Second, article V, section 25 of the Texas
Constitution was repealed and replaced by article V, section 31.107 The promulgation of article V, section 31 accomplished three things; it retained procedural rule-making power in the supreme court; 0 8 elevated to

soliciting input from the bar to possible changes in procedural rules, and publicizing the results
of the main committee. Id. at 77 1. Additionally, the reform movement provided mechanisms
to change procedural rules in the future. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (Vernon
1987)(supreme court given power to subsequently change rules originally validated September
1, 1941 with later amendments if notice requirements of 173 1a met); see also Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 11 (1978)(while court-made
rules or subsequent amendments do not need express approval of legislature, legislature may
disapprove both rules proclaimed and/or their amendments). Numerous sources presently can
initiate a rule change within the Texas court system. See id. at 12-22. These sources include
the: (1) Texas Legislature (practical accommodation between legislature and court is essential
for the former's role in developing the substantive policy decisions that often lie behind a
procedural rule); (2) Texas Judicial Council (legislative creature designed to continually study
the organization, rules, practice of Texas judiciary and formulate methods of simplifying judicial procedure); (3) Committee on Administration of Justice (Rules and Statutes subcommittee
reports suggestions to the committee on Administration of Justice which is a standing committee of the State Bar of Texas); (4) Supreme Court Advisory Committee (main role is recommendation of policy and submitting specific language of rules to be included in amended rules);
(5) Texas judiciary (supreme court may make minor corrections to rules on its own without
prior submission to Supreme Court Advisory Committee or other agency for study); (6) federal
courts (federal court decision declaring a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure unconstitutional compels review of the pertinent rule); (7) local bar associations (local associations may propose
changes in existing rules); and (8) members of the bar (individual practitioners may submit
changes to one of the standing committees for review). Id.
104. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988)(recodified by Act of June 12,
1985, ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2048, effective September 1, 1985).
105. See Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 480, § 27, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2049 (recodification without substantive revision of statutes relating to judiciary).
106. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(rules of court effective until
disapproved by legislature).
107. Compare TE.:. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1891, repealed 1985)(supreme court has power
to promulgate procedural rules not inconsistent with state law) with TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 31
(supreme court responsible for administration of judiciary, shall promulgate rules not inconsistent with state law and legislature may delegate other power to state's highest courts to promulgate other rules).
108. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b) (supreme court shall create procedural rules not
inconsistent with state law).
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constitutional status authority to promulgate rules of administration;"

9

and

reserved the legislature's right to extend further rule-making power to the

supreme court in the future."' While the legislative history to article V,
section 31 clarifies the legislature's intent to strengthen the supreme court's

authority to draft its own rules of administration and procedure,' 1 ' it is not

apparent that the legislature intended to abdicate its role in the rule-making
process as ultimate arbiter. 1 2 That tension between delegation and final review of court rule-making power must now be addressed.
III.

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING NON-REVIEWABILITY OF SUPREME
COURT RULES

A.

The New Jersey Distinction Between Substantive and Procedural
Rules: ProceduralIndependence
In 1950, the supreme court of New Jersey declared its procedural indepen-

dence from the legislature in Winberry v. Salisbury."3 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a procedural court rule, validly enacted pursuant
to its constitutional rule-making power, could not subsequently be modified
or repealed by the legislature." 4 Since Winberry, nine other states have
adopted constitutional provisions expressly granting their supreme courts
exclusive rule-making power,' 5 and one state court has adopted exclusive
109. See id. § 3 1(a) (supreme court has responsibility for judicial administration in Texas
and shall create administrative rules for all courts).
110. See id. § 31(c) (legislature may delegate to Supreme Court power to create other
rules prescribed by law or constitution).
11. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 69TH LEGISLATURE, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22-23 (1985)(committee recommendations to amend constitution to
vest supreme court with explicit powers over administration of judicial branch and allow legislature to delegate rule-making authority). The committee report specifically encourages the
supreme court to promulgate administrative rules in setting policies and guidelines while simultaneously carrying forth the duties of articles 2328b and 5966 which created and defined
the Office of Court Administration. Id.
112. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(a) (supreme court shall promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with laws of State); id. § 31(b) (supreme court shall promulgate rules
of civil procedure not inconsistent with laws of State); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a)
(Vernon 1988)(court has full rule-making power but shall not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights of litigant); id. § 22.004(b) (rules and amendments remain effective until legislative disapproval).
113. 74 A.2d 406 (N.J.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
114. Id. at 414; see also Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial RuleMaking: An AppraisalofWinberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 244-45 (1951)(constitutional convention history shows evidence contrary to court's holding).
115. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (5); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21; HAWAII CONST. art.
VI, § 7; ILL. CONST. art VI, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 116; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; N.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 3; PA. CONST. art. V, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. See generally, Browde &
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judicial rule-making power based upon the separation of powers doctrine."l 6
Aside from the controversy Winberry engendered,"" 7 the decision embodied
a "pure" notion of separation of powers distilling rule-making as an exclusive judicial function."'
The court's decision in Winberry turned upon its interpretation of the
words "subject to law" in the judicial article of the state constitution. 1 9 The

Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The
Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 477-78 (1985)(jurisdictions in which
procedural rule-making exclusive judicial function). For comparative purposes, the text of
representative state constitutional provisions granting their supreme courts rule-making power
are provided below. "The Supreme Court shall have ... [plower to make rules relative to all
procedural matters in any court." ARIZ. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5 (5). "The Supreme Court shall
make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and shall make and
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except that the
general assembly shall have the power to provide simplified procedures in county courts for
claims not exceeding five hundred dollars and for the trial of misdemeanors." COLO. CONST.
art. VI, § 21. "The Supreme Court shall have the power to proscribe rules governing its appellate jurisdiction, rules for the appointment of commissioners and other court personnel, and
make rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice ...... Ky. CONST. § 116. "The
Supreme Court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and
procedure in all courts of this state." MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5. "The [supreme] court shall
have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the
courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process practice and procedure, which shall have
the force and effect of law." W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
116. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (N.M.
1976)(separation of powers basis for exclusive rule-making function of supreme court), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
117. Compare Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRule-Making: An
Appraisalof Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 241-45 (1951)(criticizing exclusivity of rule-making in New Jersey) with Pound, ProcedureUnder Rules of Court in New Jersey,
66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 28-29 (1952)(nonreviewable rule-making power in supreme court important advance in recognizing court's role).
118. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 410 (N.J.)(supreme court's rule-making
power not subject to overriding legislation but confined to practice, procedure and administration), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); see also Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over
Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29
(1958)(accepting court obligated to make rules but rejecting rule-making isolated in supreme
court). But see Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28,
33 (1952)(rule-making made judicial by New Jersey's Constitution, not by legislative
delegation).
119. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408-11 (N.J.)(examining history and meaning of "subject to law"), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); see also N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, $
3. Prior drafts to the final version of the contested constitutional phrase contained the identical language but positioned the controversial phrase differently. See Kaplan & Greene, The
Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65
HARV. L. REV. 234, 241-45 (1951)(relating history of constitutional convention and proposed
judicial article). Associate Justice Arthur Vanderbilt, who would later become chief justice
and the author of the majority's decision, attempted to persuade the Committee on the Judiciary to delete the phrase "subject to law" to ensure unfettered rule-making power in the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [], No. 1, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:139

1947 New Jersey Constitution stated: "The Supreme Court shall make rules
governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the
law, the practice and procedure in all such courts ... ."12o Though the
history of the article's formulation indicated the troubled phrase meant
"subject to the overriding power of the Legislature with respect to practice
and procedures .. ,,121 the Winberry court interpreted "subject to law" to
122
mean subject to substantive law alone.
In essence, the New Jersey Supreme Court found procedural rule-making
to be an integral part of the operation of the courts that could not be altered
by the legislature.' 2 3 The Winberry court evidently assumed that the legislature could be safely excluded from the procedural domain without the court
encroaching upon the legislature's right to proclaim substantive rights and
duties.' 2 4 Notwithstanding the criticisms of this position, 25 states adopting

supreme court. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A
Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1958)(judiciary committee
persuaded to alter "subject to law" language for fear of legislative reversal). In the chief justice's opinion for the court, no mention is made of the convention's history, nor recognition of
his own letter before the convention's judiciary committee that the phrase "subject to law"
meant the rule-making power of the supreme court was made subject to legislative control. See
id. at 25-26.
120. N.J. CONsT. art. VI, § 2, 3.
121. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisal
of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 242 (1951)(citing New Jersey Constitutional
Convention of 1947, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary 8 (Aug. 26, 1947)). The committee further clarified what it intended the provision to mean by stating, "[r]esponsibility for
administration, practice and procedure in all the courts of the State is vested in the Supreme
Court but the Legislature may revise or repeal the rules of practice and procedure, or initiate
new provisions on the subject ..
" Winberry, 74 A.2d at 416. After passage in the committee, the vice-chairman of the judiciary committee presented the approved version of the article
to the convention floor:
You will note that the Supreme Court is given comprehensive power to adopt rules of
practice and procedure for all courts in the State, a power analogous to that possessed
now by the United States Supreme Court. However, the Legislature would have power
under the Committee Proposal to alter those rules of practice, analogous to the power
now possessed by the Congress of the United States.
Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 243 (1951)(citing I N.J. CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 146-47).

122. Winberry, 74 A.2d at 410 ("subject to law" can only mean subject to substantive law

as distinguished from practice and pleading).
123. See id at 409 (rule-making essential to operation of integrated judicial system).
124. See id at 411 (grant of complete power to judiciary to make rules necessarily ex-

cludes concepts of legislative override). Commenting on the Judiciary Commission's report at
the Constitutional Convention, the Winberry court noted when the supreme court is given

complete power to make rules in administration, pleading and practice, "complete power and
responsibility in the judiciary are concepts quite inconsistent with the notions of overriding
legislation." Id; see also Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits
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the New Jersey view have realized the benefits of a centralized and stream-

lined court system.I2 6 Courts in these jurisdictions are able to respond immediately and with flexibility to current problems, as opposed to legislative
interventions which tend to be rigid and unresponsive to change.12 7

The Winberry court did not base its decision of exclusive nonreviewable
128
rule-making on the inherent powers of the court to promulgate rules.
Rather, the holding was based on the state constitution and the separation of

of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1985)(Winberry adopts Dean Pound's
theory that courts have more expertise on court procedure and should not allow legislature to
tinker with resulting product).
125. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation ofPowers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 453-55 (1985)(summarizing and criticizing Chief Justice
Vanderbilt's theory that rule-making can safely be entrusted to courts without fear that court
will invade legislature's domain of substantive law). Vanderbilt's proposition elicits the greatest criticism of unreviewable court rule-making power: the court will expand its own authority
at the expense of the legislature when it creates procedural rules by encroaching on or making
substantive law. See id. at 454-55, 461-62. This is not to say the court will usurp legislative
power or that judiciary will become a tyrant. Id. at 461-462. The encroachment on the legislature's domain to create substantive rights occurs in minute steps. Id. Subsequent cases from
New Jersey illustrate this point. See State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 613 (N.J. 1977)(separation of powers should not prevent supreme court from adopting rules which have some effect
on executive and legislative functions); Suchit v. Baxt, 423 A.2d 670, 680 (N.J. Super.
1980)(supreme court rule can be both procedural in determining how a judgment is obtained
and substantive when dealing with evidence affecting outcome of judgment). In rejecting the
judicial-legislative rule-making approach, New Jersey utilizes a sole outcome test. Id. The
distinguishing element in classifying whether a rule is substantive or procedural is determined
by inquiring whether the rule is the "sole outcome" of the proceedings by itself or if it is but
"one step in the ladder to final determination and can effectively aid a court function." If the
rule is the "sole outcome" of the controversy, the rule is substantive. If the rule is only part of
the process of final disposition of a controversy, the rule is procedural. Id.
126. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1958). But see Gallant, Judicial RuleMaking Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation ofPowers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447,
455-61 (1985)(abuse of exclusive rule-making power has been demonstrated in usurpation of
power to define primary substantive rights, rules modifying substantive rights, and rules affecting substantive rights collateral to cause of action).
127. See id. at 453 (familiarity with court procedures allow judiciary to produce better
rules and impervious to political pressures that distort legislative judgment); Kaplan &
Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 248 (1951)(court's rule-making power not exhausted by first
promulgation of rules but allows further revision); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 38
(1958)(legislative intervention frustrates judicial rule-making while court management of internal procedures allows rapid self-revision).
128. Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 409-10 (N.J.)(exclusive nonreviewable rulemaking power of supreme court found on construing N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
3), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
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governmental powers.129 One state,0 however, has used the inherent power
rationale to reach the same result.13
B. Inherent Power as a Basis of Rule-Making
All courts in an independent court system have the inherent power to
declare legislative enactments invalid that transgress the boundary separating judicial from legislative power13 1 or that constitute a "palpable encroachment upon the independence" of the judiciary. 32 Although inherent
power is authority possessed without being explicitly derived from another
source of authority, 33 actions taken by a court based on this doctrine are
necessarily dependent on the constitution creating the court charging it with
the efficient administration of justice. 134 Inherent powers of a court are

129. Id. ("subject to law" in N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2,

3 cannot mean subject to legisla-

tion enabling legislature to override supreme court's constitutional duty to make rules). The
court further supported its rationale in explaining that the intent of the people in ratifying the
new constitution was to establish an integrated judicial system which necessitated centralization of rule-making power. Id. at 410.
130. See Jennings v. State, 633 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Ark.)(rule enabling act recognizes and
harmonizes with court's inherent power to promulgate rules of criminal procedure), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
131. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1927)(each branch of government
possesses not only powers expressly granted by constitutional authority but also auxiliary powers necessary to make express power effective); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
147 (1872)(Congress' withdrawal of supreme court jurisdiction to hear writ of habeas corpus
and mandate to make impotent presidential pardon cross boundary of separation of powers
rendering action void); Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 (June 22,
1988)(Spears, J., concurring)(to adhere to contrary view would allow legislative power to make
judiciary inoperative or subordinate branch of government).
132. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859). This decision states the basic underlying
rationale for judicial inherent power: control over the judiciary by the legislature impeding the
judicial constitutional mandate to administer justice is intolerable. Id. The idea that the legislature has power to dictate to the courts how it will make its decisions or the mode and manner
which the judiciary is to discharge its official functions does not exist and cannot be sanctioned
by any court which has respect for its own independence and dignity. Id.; see also Burton v.
Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Ky. Ct. App. 1938)(court refused to be bound by statute denying
courts right to issue decision in case already adjudicated where delay renders judgment futile).
133. See Eichelburger v. Eichelburger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. 1979)(inherent
power not derived from constitutional provision or legislative grant of power but from fact that
court created and empowered with specific responsibilities and duties). The definition of inherent power from Black's Law Dictionary states: "[a]n authority possessed without its being
derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without receiving that right,
ability, or faculty from another."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979).

134. See Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
31, 52 (1982)(implicit, implied or inherent power dependent upon explicit constitutional power
by definition). Spitzer states that "implicit" and "implied" powers are both derived:
from the Latin implicare, to enfold, entwine or envelope, such that whatever concept is
"enfolded" is dependent upon the concept into which it is folded. "Inherent" comes from
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those "which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the
administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and
integrity." 13 5
The use of the judiciary's inherent power is limited by definition 13 6 to
compel specific action or invalidate external attempts to dictate how judges
should make their decisions.1 37 In Texas, inherent power has been utilized
to compel payment for process servers from Commissioner's Court, 138 compel the salaries of essential judicial employees, 139 define standards for the
regulation of the practice of law," 4 correct judicial entries in its own min-

haerere, to cling or stick to; hence an inherent concept is one dependent for its existence
upon the concept onto which it clings.

Id. at n. 117; see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1927)(supreme court upholding congressional use of subpoena and contempt powers necessary to make express constitutional powers effective); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)(auxiliary powers
limited to extent necessary to carry out legislature's function). The Watkins court further
commented on Congress' inherent power to conduct investigations in the legislative process
stating, "[no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate
task of the Congress." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
135. Eichelburger,582 S.W.2d at 398; see also Richey, A Modern Management Technique
for Trial Courts to Improve the Quality of Justice: RequiringDirect Testimony to be Submitted
in Written Form Prior to Trial, 72 GEO. L.J. 73, 75 (1983)(inherent power of courts speaks to
questions not specifically authorized by legislative enactment necessary for judiciary's accomplishment of constitutional mandate). Orders by courts based on inherent power are calculated to efficiently adjudicate controversies and serve the public interest. Id.
136. See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 173-74 (though each branch of government has explicit
and auxiliary powers, auxiliary powers limited to make express power effective). The U. S.
Supreme Court would later narrow the use of auxiliary powers by requiring their use to be
limited to the extent necessary to carry out that branch's function. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at
187 (inherent investigatory power must be in furtherance of legitimate function of Congress).
137. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control OverJudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1958)(statutes that violate minimum
functional integrity of courts clearly offend constitutional scheme and will be held unconstitutional based on separation of powers).
138. See Vondy v. Comm'r's Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Tex.
1981)(court has inherent power to compel payment of county constables serving process to
allow proper function of state judicial system).
139. See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 (June 22,
1988)(Spears, J., concurring)(court has inherent power absent statutory authority to compel
expenditure of public funds for essential court personnel so court may fulfill constitutional
function); District Judges of 188th Judicial Dist. v. County Judge, 657 S.W.2d 908, 909-10
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(courts have inherent power to compel legislature to allocate funds for judicial personnel and facilities necessary to perform constitutional
functions); Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109 (district court has inherent power to appoint probation
personnel and set compensation if necessary for effective administration of justice); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.051 (Vernon 1988)(official district court reporter paid salary set by
judge of that court ministerially approved by commissioner's court of each county).
140. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice Comm. v. Cortez, 692 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tex.
1985)(supreme court has inherent power to determine what constitutes unauthorized practice
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14 3
utes,14 1 control its judgments, 4 2 compel witnesses to appear and testify,
and to hold individuals in contempt of court.'" In each of the above examples, the court's use of its inherent power is necessarily grounded in an essenenables it to fulfill its constitutional duty of
tial judicial function 4that
5
administering justice.'
In the rule-making context, each court also has the inherent power to proThe
mulgate rules necessary for the efficient administration of justice.'
Texas Supreme Court could employ this rationale when promulgating rules

of law); State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. 1980)(supreme court promulgated State Bar Act as exercise of inherent power to regulate practice of law); Scott v. State, 86
Tex. 321, 323, 24 S.W. 789, 790 (1894)(inherent power to disbar attorney); Burns v. State, 76
S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934, no writ)(legislative action yields to
supreme court's inherent power to regulate attorneys pursuant to TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 for
hindering essential judicial function), rev'd on other grounds, 129 Tex. 303, 103 S.W.2d 960
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1937, op. adopted).
141. See Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 33, 285 S.W. 1079, 1082 (1926)(inherent power to
correct judicial entries in court minutes).
142. See Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 494, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912)(inherent
power to correct mistakes in court record by order nunc pro tunc independent of statute or
motion of party); Cohen v. Moore, 101 Tex. 45, 46-47, 104 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1907)(court has
plenary power to set aside own judgment within court's same term).
143. See Burttschell v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 113, 116, 69 S.W.2d 402, 403 (1934)(inherent
power to summon witness for administration of justice); Cleveland v. State, 508 S.W.2d 829,
831 (Tex. Crim. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no pet.)(court may use inherent power to hold witness in contempt for failure to testify).
144. See Ex Parte Barnette, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980)(inherent power to punish
party refusing to obey court order); Ex Parte Brown, 543 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. 1976)(inherent
power to hold party in contempt for refusing to obey court order); Ex Parte Myrick, 474
S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1971, no writ)(inherent power to enforce judgment by contempt).
145. See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 (June 22,
1988)(Spears, J., concurring)(courts' inherent power preserves judicial branch of government,
preserves citizens freedom and security and provides check on abuse of authority by other
branches of government). The Mays court stated, "[i]f the courts are to provide that check,
they cannot be subservient to the other branches of government but must ferociously shield
their ability to judge independently and fairly. This is the essence of our very existence." Id.;
see also Eichelburger, 582 S.W.2d at 398-99 (inherent power to enable courts to effectively
perform judicial functions and to protect dignity, independence and integrity); cf. Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)(auxiliary power of Congress must be related to and
further express legitimate tasks). The mandate of Texas courts to further its constitutional
duty of administering justice is derived from the Texas Constitution itself. See TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 31(a)(b) (supreme court responsible for efficient administration of judicial branch and
shall promulgate rules of procedure necessary for "efficient and uniform administration of
justice").
146. See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974)(enforcement of discovery
inherent power of court and beyond regulation by legislature); Jennings v. State, 633 S.W.2d
373, 374 (Ark.)(court has inherent power to promulgate rules of criminal procedure), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
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of procedure so long as the rule would be essential to the continuing effective
administration of court business. 4 7 Closely allied to this end is the use of
inherent power to strike down a statute that encroaches on an exclusively
judicial function.14 8 This confrontation raises the issue of separation of powers. 149 The Connecticut Supreme Court relied upon both the court's inherent power and the doctrine of separation of powers in holding its legislature
had intruded on the exclusive rule-making function of the judiciary.' 50
In State v. Clemente,' the defendant relied on a statute that would compel the prosecution to produce oral or written statements in possession of the
prosecution relating to the subject matter the witness testified to on direct
examination.' 52 The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled the legislative statute that compelled discovery was in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine."5 3 By this ruling, the Connecticut Supreme Court granted itself
the power to be the final arbiter of court rules.' 54 The court initially examined the legislative statute by a two-step test.' 55 First, if the rule could be
established as procedural, it would lie within the exclusive domain of the
judiciary.' 5 6 If the rule was substantive, it would lie in the proper domain of
the legislature. Unable to classify the statute in issue as exclusively procedural or substantive, the court moved to a second test by examining the

147. See Vondy v. Comm'r's Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Tex.
198 1)(inherent power to protect proper administration of judiciary); Eichelburger,582 S.W.2d
at 398 (inherent power not derived from legislative or constitutional grant but by fact court
constitutionally created).
148. See Clemente, 353 A.2d at 731 (legislative statute on discovery unconstitutionally
intruded on judicial power under court's exclusive control).
149. Id. (separation of powers provides court with exclusive rule-making authority which
legislature cannot invalidate); State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Wash. 1974)(procedural
rule-making inherent power of supreme court necessary for smooth judicial process and cannot
be abridged or modified by legislature).
150. See Clemente, 353 A.2d at 728-29, 731 (rule-making within court's exclusive domain
which legislature cannot enter by virtue of separation of powers and which judiciary can exclude legislature by inherent power for encroaching on judiciary's exclusive subject-matter).
151. 353 A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974).
152. See Clemente, 353 A.2d at 731-32.
153. See id. at 731 (statute would infringe upon superior court's discretion to control
discovery within court's inherent powers). In declaring the legislative statute unconstitutional,
the court perceived a gradual invasion of the legislature on the judiciary's exclusive domain
eventually rendering the latter little more than a judicial staff of the legislature. Id.
154. See Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited - Three Recent Decisions:
State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121, 127
(1983)(potential effect of Clemente court's decision to utilize exclusive rule-making authority
without legislative review whatsoever).
155. See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 727-28 (Conn. 1974)(initial two-step substantive/procedural test to define effect of statute on court proceedings if statute fits within one of

categories).
156. Id.
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practice in issue and the developing doctrine of separation of powers.' 5 7 After determining that the statute invaded the judiciary's power to utilize its
discretion in controlling discovery, it was struck as an unconstitutional enWhile the court's
croachment of what is the judiciary's exclusive domain.'
5 9
decision was criticized on other grounds,' the unanswered issue remains
whether absolute control over rule-making by the judiciary undermines the
separation of powers doctrine by prohibiting review by another branch of
government. 16
IV.
A.

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF COURT RULES

InstitutionalIncompetence?

It has been argued that nonreviewable judicial rule-making, absent a constitutional provision, must demonstrate the reason the legislature should be
excluded rather than share power with the court.16 ' Despite the fact that

157. Id. at 728. The second prong of the test was enunciated as:
While necessity and right of each department [of the government] to use the means requisite to its unfettered operation is clear, it is equally clear that when one department not
only uses the means appropriate to another, but uses them for the purpose of executing
the functions of that other department, it is not in the exeroise of its granted power ...
[t]he test of constitutionality of a statute which imposed additional duties on a judge of
the Superior Court was whether the "duties interfere with the orderly performance by the
Superior Court of its judicial functions" [citations omitted].
Id.
158. Id. at 731.
159. See id. at 735 (Cotter, J., dissenting), 741 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting). Justice Cotter
criticized the majority's conclusion that discovery was an exclusive jtdicial function based on
the fact that discovery was not an inherent common law power of the court. See id at 736-37.
160. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 27-41 (1975)(criticized holding as substantial departure from meaning of
separation of powers and invalid extension of Connecticut case law); Note, Court Rule-Making
in Connecticut Revisited - Three Recent Decisions: State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and
State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121, 122, 138 (1983)(despite Connecticut Supreme Court's
failure to adequately address scope of courts rule-making authority, legislature cannot participate in rule-making enactment and review). The essential criticism of the majority's opinion in
State v. Clemente is that when rule-making is an inherent power exclusive to the judiciary,
independent review of court promulgated rules is an impossibility. This is because implicit in
rule-making enacted pursuant to inherent power is the presumption of constitutional legitimacy. See Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited - Three Recent Decisions: State
v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121, 138 (1983)(Clemente court offered no constitutional principles underlying limits to judicial rule-making raising presumption that court's acts are constitutional). Hence, the ultimate source on defining
the limits of inherent power is not the constitution, but the court itself. Id.
161. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975)(Connecticut supreme court rule excluding legislative participation
or supervision must be defended by arguments of legislative incompetence not judicial competence). Professor Kay emphatically states his point in noting that [legislative] "incompetence
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legislative rule-making ran afoul in the twentieth century amid the cry of
legislative incompetence,162 judicial independence to promulgate rules does
not require legislative withdrawal to preserve the necessary balance of power
between these two branches of government.163 Since 1941, the Texas judiciary has regularly made swift and efficient adjustments to practical problems
facing the court system, obviating legislative incompetence and lethargy
without eradicating the legislature's role. 1" 4 Should the Texas Supreme
Court nevertheless find that exclusive rule-making power resides in the judiciary, it must justify why complete removal of such power from the legislature enhances judicial performance. Compelling reasons for this conclusion
include the reforms legislatures have historically instigated as well as the
need for continued examination of court-made rules to ensure the balance of
powers in government.
Although some state courts believe that the legislature has no place in
formulating rules of procedure, rule-making actually benefits from legislative
input."' While judges exert their legal expertise on rule-making, daily contact with procedural rules may influence judges to pass rules which promote
speed and administrative efficiency at the expense of rules which illuminate
the merits of a controversy and protect the rights of litigants.16 6 Addition-

must be so severe that not only can the legislature not be trusted to draft rules of procedure,
but it cannot be trusted even to retain power of supervision and disapproval." Id. The argument then is not whether judicial or legislative rules are preferable, but if complete withdrawal
of the legislature from any role enhances the judicial function. Id. at 34; see also Gallant,
Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38
OKLA. L. REV.447, 474 (1985)(legislative review of court rule-making essential to preservation of balance of powers).
162. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1975)(early twentieth century government placed rule-making in
hands of legislators who were always well-meaning but also always inept).
163. See id. at 35-36 (rule-making with legislative participation benefits courts primary
role by ensuring substantive right of litigants protected over judicial expediency); see also
Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1958)(judicial independence does not require immunity that would remove legislature from all power to adjust state courts to citizen needs).
164. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
10-12 (1978)(court rewrote all civil rules of procedure at first promulgation in 1941 and since
has amended numerous times). There were 99 amendments to the Texas Rules of Procedure in
the 1987 revision. See Order of Supreme Court of Texas, Adopting and Amending Texas Civil
Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 TEX. B.J. 850, 850 (1987).
165. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975)(rule-making benefits from legislative input as opposed to implication of incompetence by exclusive rule-making power in courts); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 17-20 (1958)(legislative review prohibits judicial encroachment on substantive law).
166. See Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CONN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975)judges get overly attached to particular procedural system).
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ally, familiarity with one method of procedure may induce resistance to
change and distrust of new proposals.167 While legislative attempts at rule-

making may be perceived as interfering with a judicial function,16 suggestions for change can encourage judicial action.1 69 For example, it was only
after the Texas Legislature passed chapter 9 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code that the Texas Supreme Court rewrote Rule of Civil Procedure
13.17 Initial judicial complacency in the area of frivolous pleadings motivated the legislature to enact its own solution to the perceived problem and,
in turn, spurred judicial action in rewriting Rule of Civil Procedure 13.171
B.

The Substantive/ProceduralDistinction
If it is decided that the judiciary possesses authority over rule-making as

167. Id. at 36 (while judges competent to initiate procedural change danger lies in judiciary's lack of will to initiate).
168. See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921)(legislative
action in rule-making often mars when it would mend). Justice Cardozo's stance of legislative
involvement in rule-making is plain from his comment: "The Legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible
or disinterested or systematic advise as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend." Id.
169. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001-.014 (Vern. Supp.
1988)(Texas Legislature's frivolous pleadings and claims statute) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 13
(Texas Supreme Court's frivolous pleading rule repealing legislature's frivolous pleading statute). Though the time sequence is not conclusive in itself, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee's meeting of June 26-27, 1987 recommending passage of Rule 13, shows an attempt by
the Texas Supreme Court to regain rule-making power from the Texas Legislature. See
Supreme Court Advisory Committee, Transcript of Meeting of June 26-27, 1987, Vol. II. 11012, 211-12 (available at Texas State Law Library, Austin, Texas). Chairman Soules stated:
"We've got to do something to supplant that statute or concede now that we've let the legislature get in the rule-making business." Id. at 110. Mr. Spivy interjected: "[Ilf what you were
addressing ... was that the attempt by the legislature is not just a use of the court's function,
but at the same time it is an attempt to use the discretion of the court's function. And I think
we ought to be a little bit careful not just to react on that basis, number one. Number two, not
to make it appear that we're reacting on that basis." Id. at 111-12. Chairman Soules later
remarked: "This legislature is the first legislature that has ever intruded on the Supreme
Court's rule-making power, and there are a lot of reasons for that. And the next time if we
[the Supreme Court Advisory Committee] get started on the right foot, maybe it won't happen." Id. at 211-12.
170. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001 - 9.014 (Vernon Supp.
1988)(frivolous pleadings enactment by legislature); Supreme Court of Texas Advisory Committee, Transcript of Meeting of June 26-27, 1987, Vol. II, at 110-12 (available at Texas State
Law Library, Austin, Texas)(passage of Rule 13 court reaction to legislative enactment of
chapter 9, Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
171. See Supreme Court of Texas Advisory Committee, Transcript of Meetings of June
26-27, 1987, Vol. II, at 110-12 (available at Texas State Law Library, Austin,
Texas)(promulgation of rule 13 in reaction to legislature's passage of frivolous pleadings statute only days earlier).
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an outgrowth of the separation of powers principle, 7 2 it is natural to protect
that control over rule-making by guaranteeing the judiciary final power over
its own procedure.' 7 3 Examination of this thesis reveals that the real issue
is the balance, not separation, of powers among the three divisions of government. 174 Whether a court arrives at the position of independent rule-

making power by constitutional interpretation as in Winberry,175 or as a

172. See Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926)(from
either historical or analytical perspective rule-making belongs to courts not legislature);
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 32-33
(1952)(New Jersey correctly brought to fruition modem system of justice by implanting rulemaking power in supreme court); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judicial Procedure are
Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 276 (1928)(legislature exceeds constitutional power
when it proclaims rules of procedure which judiciary must implement).
173. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 471 (1985)(supporters of judicial rule-making suggest
nonreviewability of court made rules guarantees judicial independence); Pound, Procedure
UnderRules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 32-33 (1952)(remedy for legislative
tinkering in rule-making is to vest full power over rule-making in judiciary).
174. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 471 (1985)(legislative review of court rules does not
damage heart of judicial function adjudicating controversies and enforcing orders). Gallant's
view challenges Dean Wigmore's theory that legislative action in the rule-making sphere is
constitutionally void if an absolutist and rigid approach to the separation of powers doctrine is
adhered to. See id. But see Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for JudicialProcedure are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV.276, 279 (1928)(procedural rule-making properly within judiciary's domain while procedural rules enacted by legislature void). Gallant maintains that
only when the heart of the judicial function is impaired is legislative review of court rules void.
See Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of
Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV.447, 471 (1985)(legislative rules do not impair court's role unless
courts ability to adjudicate controversies and enforce own orders hindered); Gibbons, The Interdependence ofLegitimacy: An Introductionto the Meaning of Separationof Powers, 5 SETON
HALL L. REV. 435, 436 (dispersal of decisional responsibility ensures protection against "tyrannical exercise of power" when second independent branch concurs); Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1975)(real
value behind separation of powers doctrine are checks and balances between branches of government). The real threat to the judiciary is the exercise by the executive or legislative branch
that removes judicial power to review controversies or discourages its operation. See Gallant,
Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38
OKLA. L. REV. 447, 471 (1985)(real threat to judiciary exists outside legislative review of
procedural rules). Historical examples of this threat are not manifested in legislative revision
or review of procedural rules, but from attacks on fundamental judicial power. See Levin &
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A .Problemin ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29-33 (1958)(exclusive domain of judicial power are matters essential to its integrity and dignity); see also Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative
Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers 38 OKLA. L. REV.447, 472 (1985)(examples include withdrawal of habeas corpus jurisdiction from U.S. Supreme Court, explosion of particular litigation overwhelming court system, failure to adequately fund court system, and
attempts to divest court of power to examine social or economic legislation).
175. Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 411 (N.J.)(interpretation of New Jersey consti-
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matter of a court's inherent power as in Clemente,'76 the effect of this position weakens the balance of powers by precluding review of those rules by an
independent branch of government.' 7 7
The problem in distinguishing between substantive and procedural law
and using these definitions to allocate the proper scope of rule-making authority stems from the inherent imprecision of the boundary that separates
the two concepts. 7 ' Former Chief Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme
Court illustrated this difficulty when he wrote:
The limits of procedural and substantive law have not been defined
and no two could agree where one leaves off and the other begins.
There is also between the two a hiatus or twilight zone that has been
constantly entered by the courts and the Legislatures ....
Another element that lends confusion to the situation is that the current of substantive law and procedural law often coalesce. What is retution established rule-making power in supreme court not subject to legislative veto but confined to administration, practice and procedure), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
176. State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974)(exclusive judicial power over
procedure results from court's inherent power which legislature cannot intrude into).
177. See Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
31, 60 (1982)(courts should no more be immune from checks and balances than any other
branch); see also Note, Court Rule-Making in ConnecticutRevisited - Three Recent Decisions:
State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121, 127
(1983)(absolute judicial authority over rule-making undermines separation of powers doctrine
by precluding review by independent branch). The separation of powers doctrine is maintained by two dependent theories: (1) by an absolute distribution of power between three coequal branches; (2) distribution of power with review granted to other branches to protect
against an excessive accumulation of power in one branch that decreases actual power in the
other two. Id. at 128.
178. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)(procedural definition). The
Sibbach court defined procedure as "[t]he judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Id. Unfortunately, this definition is only helpful if substance and procedure
were two "mutually exclusive categories with easily ascertainable contents." Id. at 17 (Frankfurter J., dissenting). Brooks v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(procedure so broad that it is misunderstood,
difficult to define and seldom used as term of art); Green, To What Extent May Courts Under
the Rule-Making Power PrescribeRules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482, 483 (1940)(procedural
law vaguely defined). Green stated:
Procedural law can only be vaguely defined; it is adjective law, it is auxiliary to the substantive law and provides the method of enforcing substantive rights; a given rule may be
treated as dealing with a substantive right in one case and with procedure in another,
because of the difference between the ultimate questions in the two cases. The answer to
the question, "What is procedure?" depends upon the answer to another question, "Why
do you want to know?"
Id.; see also Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1958)(rational separation between
substance and procedure near impossible).
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garded as substantive law today may become procedural law tomorrow
and vice versa. Conflicts on this point have given rise to powers that are
said to be not strictly legislative or judicial and when this is the case, the
power of the Legislature is dominant.

79

Despite the inherent difficulty in definitively delineating what properly belongs within the domain of rule-making, proponents that advocate nonreviewable judicial rule-making18 0 have assured their critics that the judiciary
may be entrusted not to cross the line separating substantive and procedural
law. " ' Notwithstanding this assertion, the separation of powers is not

179. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57, 59 (Fla. 1940). Texas Courts have been satisfied with the definitions of
procedural and substantive law found in Corpus Juris Secundum. See Brooks, 358 S.W.2d at
414 (defining procedure and substantive law). Those definitions state:
Procedure is the machinery for carrying on the suit, and it includes pleading, process,
evidence, and practice, whether in the trial court or the appellate court, or in the
processes by which causes are carried to appellate courts for review, or in laying the
foundation for such review; in fact, procedure includes every step which may be taken
from the beginning to the end of a case.
Id. (quoting 72 C.J.S. Practice(1951)). Substantive law "includes those rules and principles
which fix and declare primary rights of individuals as respects their persons and their property,
and quite generally fix the type of remedy available in case of invasion of those rights .. " Id.
at 414-15 (quoting 52 C.J.S. Law (1947)); see also Lubbock Indep. School Dist. v. Bradley, 579
S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(substantive law includes
rules and principles that fix and declare rights of individuals respecting their person and property rights and remedy for invasion); Cass v. McFarland, 564 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso, 1978, no writ)(substantive law is positive law of duties and rights which may
rise to cause of action); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.])(procedure is machinery for carrying on suit which includes process, evidence, pleadings and practice), rev'd on other grounds, 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).
180. See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974)(statute unconstitutional for
infringing on courts inherent power to control procedure); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406,
414 (N.J.)(supreme court's rule-making power not subject to legislative override but confined
to administration, procedure and practice), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Ammerman v.
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (N.M. 1976)(legislature lacks constitutional
power to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure within exclusive domain of judiciary), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (N.M.
1975)(statutes purporting to regulate procedure and practice for judiciary not binding because
exclusive constitutional power for rule-making vested in supreme court); Pound, The
Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926)(procedure for courts belongs
within sphere of judiciary, not legislature); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for JudicialProcedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276, 276 (1928)(legislature exceeds constitutional authority in any attempt to proscribe rules that control judicial duties).
181. See Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 46
(1952)(threatened abuses by judiciary in rule-making that infringe on substantive rights "too
small to be taken seriously"). But see Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV.447, 450 (1985)(Dean Pound's
assertion of court abuse in rule-making remains predominantly untested).
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maintained solely by the distribution of power among the three branches.' 812
Ensuring legislative review of judicial court rule-making power provides an
alternative avenue of redress in a particular dispute as well as ensuring that
the judiciary remains within its rule-making authority.'
Historically, numerous examples have been noted where nonreviewable
rule-making power has been exercised to usurp power to define substantive
rights,'8 4 modify substantive rights,' 8 5 and effect substantive rights collat182. See Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited -

Three Recent Decisions:

State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REv. 121, 128
(1983)(separation of powers assured by absolute distribution of powers among three branches
of government and by distribution of review to guard against excessive accumulation of power
in one branch). More is needed than a demarcation on paper of the limits the United States (or
state) Constitution extends to each branch. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 48, at 343 (J. Madison)
(W. Dunne ed. 1901)(mere demarcation on parchment not sufficient to guard against encroachments which may lead to concentration of governmental power in same branch).
183. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation ofPowers and the JudicialRule-Making Power
in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 463-64
(1 985)(supreme court's constitutional grant of power to supervise lower courts is all it requires
to prevent legislative encroachment on judiciary authority over procedure); Gallant, Judicial
Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L.
REV. 447, 480 (1985)(legislative review permits continuous reform of procedure by cautioning
judiciary not to create substantive rights through rule-making); Note, Court Rule-Making in
Connecticut Revisited - Three Recent Decisions: State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden, and
State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121, 128 (1983)(legislative review of court rule-making
power provides forum for redress and ensures judiciary remains within limits of rule-making
power).
184. See Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny Co., 436 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa.
198 l)(court rule upheld creating prejudgment interest in certain cases though defendant's substantive rights effected by increasing amount owed to plaintiff), appealdismissed, 456 U.S. 940
(1982). The Laudenberger court supported its decision that the prejudgment interest was procedural by stating the rule was to encourage prompt settlement and reduce court dockets. Id.
at 150-51. Further support was garnered by the fact that the law of damages was deemed
procedural and concerns administration of rights acknowledged by substantive law. Id. at 155.
Although the court recognized the rule may create a substantive right to interest in the plaintiff, refusal to make rules that eventually reverberate on substantive rights would cripple the
constitutional authority of the court to make rules. Hence, the constitutional prohibition
against promulgation of rules that abridge, modify or enlarge substantive rights could not be
read too narrowly. dd; see also Note, Courts - Rules of Court - Prejudgment Interest Rule
Upheld - Expanding Courts Rule-Making Power Beyond "Practice and Procedure," 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 351-52 (1974)(Laudenberger plurality favors administrative efficiency
in rule-making over strict adherence to substantive - procedural distinction). Although the
issue of creating a substantive right in the plaintiff was not raised by the Texas Supreme Court
in its 1985 ruling granting prejudgment interest, that criticism may be what prompted the
Texas Legislature to change the time when prejudgment interest begins to accrue. Compare
Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (Tex. 1985)(plaintiff may
recover prejudgment interest compounded daily on damages accrued by time of judgment as
matter of law) with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(prejudgment interest for wrongful death, property and personal injury damages accrues 180th day
after defendant receives written notice of suit or on date suit filed, whichever occurs first and
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eral to the cause of action brought. 8 6
As an example of the second category, the North Dakota Supreme Court
in Arneson v. Olsen 17 held that a statute limiting the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in medical malpractice actions violated the procedural rule-making
powers of the supreme court which included authority to promulgate rules
of evidence.'
Because res ipsa loquitur was found by the court to be a rule
of evidence, the legislature had no authority to modify the doctrine. 8 9

ending day before judgment entered); see also State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 614 (N.J.
1977)(pretrial intervention program created by court rule allowing certain defendants to avoid
criminal trial by serving successful probation program upheld as constitutional). The Leonardis court concluded "absolute prohibition against rules which merely affect substantive
rights or liabilities, however slight such effect may be, would seriously cripple the authority
and concomitant responsibility which have been given to the Court by the Constitution." Id.
This stance has been criticized for creating substantive rights in criminal defendants to evade a
judgment against them and abridging the State's right to seek such a judgment. See Gallant,
Judicial Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38
OKLA. L. REV.447, 456 (1985)(most important aspect of court program is substantive by relieving first offenders from criminal liability, not administrative in relieving crowded court
dockets).
185. See Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978)(statute restraining use of
res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice suits violated supreme court's rule-making power over
procedure); State v. Edwards, 616 P.2d 620, 623 (Wash. 1980)(procedural rule upheld requiring mandatory release of criminal defendant if trial had not begun within 100 days without
regard to evidence of defendant's guilt for administrative purposes); see also Gallant, Judicial
Rule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L.
REV. 447, 459 (1985)(Edwards court legislated state's right to obtain criminal convictions in
particular areas while simultaneously granting defendant right to freedom).
186. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (N.M.
1976)(legislature's creation of evidentiary privilege allowing press to gather and broadcast
news without divulging sources unconstitutional for violating supreme court's rule-making
power of regulating procedure), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
187. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
188. Idl at 132.
189. Id. The North Dakota constitution grants its supreme court rule-making power by
declaring "[t]he supreme court shall have authority to promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all courts of this state .... N.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3. Citing to case law from other states, the court reasoned it also had power over evidentiary
matters which were within the scope of procedure. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 131 (procedure includes evidence); accord People v. Aguindaldo, 39 P.2d 505, 506 (Cal. 1934)(generally
defined, procedure includes pleading, evidence and practice); Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain
Corp., 189 N.E. 907, 911 (111. 1934)(procedure includes pleading, practice and evidence); Dyer
v. Keefe, 198 A.2d 159, 161 (R.I. 1964)(procedure includes evidence, pleading and practice).
While res ipsa loquitur may be characterized as a rule of evidence, it does not involve admitting
evidence. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 457 (1985)(res ipsa loquitur not usual rule concerning
admissibility of item into evidence). Rather, the doctrine concerns itself with a plaintiff's burden of proof and burden of coming forward with sufficient proof to make out a prima facie case
for the jury. Id.
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While the legislature's intent was to modify a substantive right by changing
the definition of negligence in medical malpractice actions by increasing the
plaintiff's burden of proof before recovery was possible, 190 the court perceived the legislature's action as an encroachment on its rule-making authority.1 91 The court's action negated the North Dakota Legislature's attempt to
decrease questionable medical malpractice claims in its response to the perceived medical liability cost crisis,1 92 while increasing the availability of low
cost medical and hospital services. 19 3 This example shows that legislative
review of court rules is just as necessary as judicial review of a legislature's
procedural enactments to maintain each branch's proper domain. 194 When

190. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 132 (legislative purpose of statute was to limit doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur previously available in medical malpractice actions to establish necessary

element of duty); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-07 (1978)(repealed by S.L. 1983, chapter 82,
section 154)(liability not found in medical malpractice causes of action unless expert medical
testimony or admission of fault showing deviation from standard of care and causation of
alleged death or injury); see also Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The
Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV.447, 457 (1985)(statute attempted to change
tort of medical malpractice from situation where negligence could be inferred from negative
result to necessity of producing direct evidence of improper surgical procedure to reduce nonmeritorious claims and promote availability of low cost health care).
191. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 132 (legislature's attempt to establish rules of joinder
and admissibility of evidence unconstitutional in light of judiciary's exclusive control over
evidence).
192. See id at 130 (states reacted to "medical malpractice crisis" by statute); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26-40.1-01 (1978) (repealed by S.L. 1983, chapter 82, section 154)(statute's purposes
included providing methods to eliminate expense involved in nonmeritorious medical malpractice claims in response to medical malpractice crisis).
193. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-01 (1978) (repealed by S.L. 1983, chapter 82, section 154)(statute was to assure availability of sufficient hospital and medical services to North
Dakota citizens at reasonable costs by decreasing insurance premiums of medical providers
and to attract and maintain qualified physicians to North Dakota so long as physician
qualified).
194. Compare Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 132 (legislative encroachment on court rule-making power constitutionally void) and Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d
1354, 1357 (N.M. 1976)(statute unconstitutional for violation of supreme court's exclusive
domain over rule-making), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); with State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d
607, 614 (N.J. 1977)(absolute prohibition against court rules merely affecting substantive
rights of litigants would disable supreme court's constitutional authority and responsibility
over rule-making) and Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 147,
155 (Pa. 1981)(procedural rule's effect on substantive rights of parties does not mean rule
inappropriate subject for supreme court rule-making), appealdismissed, 456 U.S. 940 (1982).
See also Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in
New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 463 (1985)(while
supreme court can and must have ultimate responsibility over rule-making, can do so without
resorting to claim of exclusive judicial power); Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 478-79 (1985)(substantive rights partially defined by procedures to enforce those rights show inexpediency of
protecting particular area of rule-making nonreviewable by legislative activity); Kay, The
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the judiciary acts to override the legislature's assertion of the public interest
in changing a substantive right, the court itself acts in a manner unsupported
by its constitutional edict to adjudicate the rights of litigants.19 5
V.
A.

THE TEXAS MODEL: SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

ProceduralIndependence?

The Texas model of rule-making sets forth the rights and duties of the
judiciary and legislature in the rule-making process.19 6 The Texas Constitution provides for the supreme court to initiate rule-making in areas of practice and procedure 197 in accordance with the Rule Making Act. The
Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40
(1975)(ultimate responsibility for making law final effect of judicial rule-making must rest with
legislature).
195. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (supreme court has authority to promulgate rules of
procedure binding on all courts of this state); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 27-02-10 (1974)(no
court rule promulgated for pleading, procedure or practice may modify, enlarge or abridge
substantive rights of any litigant in any manner); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(a)(b)
(supreme court empowered to promulgate rules of civil procedure not inconsistent with state
law necessary for efficient administration of justice); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a)
(Vernon 1988)(supreme court has full rule-making power over civil procedure and practice but
shall not enlarge, abridge or modify substantive rights of any litigant).
196. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31 (supreme court shall promulgate rules of administration and civil procedure not inconsistent with laws of state necessary for efficient administration of justice); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a),(b),(c) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court has
full rule-making power over civil procedure and practice with rules remaining effective until
disapproved by legislature).
197. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(a) ("supreme court shall make rules of civil procedure
not inconsistent with the laws of the state" (emphasis added)). The passage of the Rule Making Act by the legislature in 1939 allowed the supreme court to preempt the field of procedural
rule-making. See Bar Ass'n of Dallas v. Hexter Title & Abstract Co., 175 S.W.2d 108, 113
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1943)(Rule Making Act demonstrates legislature's will to relinquish rule-making power to supreme court), aff'd, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Garrett v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas, 140 Tex. 394, 397-98, 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1943)(rule
making act confers upon and relinquishes to supreme court full rule-making power in civil
procedure repealing all other laws governing same); Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684, 686
(Tex. Civ, App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(rule-making power invested solely in supreme
court by grant of authority by legislature); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. WW-100 (1957)(all rulemaking power now resides in supreme court from delegation by legislature). The Garrettcourt
demonstrates the supreme court's sole responsibility to initiate procedural rule changes:
The rule-making power bill by Section 1 confers upon and relinquishes to the Supreme
Court "full rule-making power in civil judicial proceedings," and repeals "all laws and
parts of laws governing the practice and procedure in civil actions," the repeal to be effective on and after September 1, 1941. Section 2 of the same act repeats that the Supreme
Court is "hereby invested with the full rule-making power in the practice and procedure
in civil actions." The broad and sweeping language thus used by the Legislature evidences an intent to invest in the Supreme Court complete authority to prescribe all rules
of procedure in civil actions and that all statutes relating to civil procedure should be
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supreme court has repeatedly utilized this process in promulgating rules of
civil procedure19 and, recently, in the field of evidence.199 The "laws of the

inoperative on and after September 1, 1941. This was broad enough to evidence an intention that all procedural statutes, including those passed at the same session of the Legislature, should become inoperative on and after September 1, 1941. Any contrary holding
would deprive the Supreme Court of the "full rule-making power," so specifically provided for in the rule-making power bill and would not result in a repeal of "all laws and
parts of laws governing the practice and procedure in civil actions," as provided forth
therein.
Garrett, 140 Tex. at 397-98, 168 S.W.2d at 638. Although article 1731(a) (Rule Making Act)
has since been recodified in the Government Code, no substantive change was intended. See
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 43(a)(b) (legislature shall provide for recodification of civil and criminal laws but without substantive change); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 1.001(a) (Vernon
1988)(revision of general and permanent statutory law without substantive change). The only
subsequent change to Garrett was the repeal of article V, section 25 of the Texas Constitution
and the enactment of article V, section 31. Compare Tex. S.J. Res. 14, § 9, 69th Leg., 1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 3355, 3359 (repealing TEX. CONST. article V, section 25 (1891)(rule-making
provision) with TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31 (current rule-making provision). Pertinent parts of
article V, section 31 state:
(a) The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial
branch and shall promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the
state ....
(b) The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not
inconsistent with the laws of the state ....
(c) The legislature may delegate to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals
the power to promulgate such other rules as may be prescribed by law or this Constitution, subject to such limitations and procedures as may be provided by law.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31. Although one may read section 31(c) to allow the legislature to reemerge as a co-equal branch of government constitutionally empowered to promulgate rules of
civil procedure, the more reasonable interpretation construes section 31(c) with section 22.004
of the Government Code which delegates any power the Texas Legislature may have to the
Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a),(c) (Vernon 1988)(supreme
court has full rule-making power in practice and procedure in civil actions). Thus, the legislature is not to have any hand in the promulgation of rules of civil procedure or act as imprimatur to rules prescribed by the supreme court. Id. Rather, the legislature possesses a veto
power over rules enacted pursuant to the constitution and the Rule Making Act. See id.
§ 22.004(b) (supreme court rules or amendments remain effective until and unless disapproved
by legislature).
198. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Texas Order, 725 S.W.2d XXXI, XXXI-LXXII
(1987)(order adopting and amending Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and published in judicial
supreme court reporter pursuant to Government Code § 22.004(d)). Ironically, there is currently no "official reporter" of the supreme court in which to publish rule changes. See Hambleton & Paulsen, The "Official" Texas Court Reports.- Birth, Death and Resurrection, 49 TEX.
B.J. 82, 82-83 (1986)(failure of Texas legislature to pass legislation allowing supreme court to
designate any reporter deemed advisable as "official" reporter of Texas Supreme Court in 1963
leaves court currently without such forum despite requirements of Texas Government Code
section 22.004); see also Hambleton & Paulsen, The "Official" Texas Court Reports: The Rest
of the Story, 49 TEX. B.J. 842, 842-43 (1986)(Texas Government Code sections 22.008 and
22.104 requiring "official" publication of decisions from state's two highest courts is currently
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state ''2"° to which the rule-making authority of the supreme court is subject,
requires the supreme court to supply a list of statutes it deems repealed when
promulgating court rules.20 1 In the event of a conflict between the legisla-

placed in recodified Government Code "in case" legislature should decide to fund "official"
reporters in future).
199. See Supreme Court of Texas Order, 641 S.W.2d XXXV, XXXV-LXVIII (1982)(order adopting Texas Rules of Evidence effective September 1, 1983).
200. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(a),(b).
201. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(c) (Vernon 1988)(to ensure supreme court
has full rule-making authority rules adopted or amended by court repeal conflicting law governing procedure and practice in civil actions). While the supreme court cannot create, enlarge, modify or abridge substantive rights of litigants, the legislature has veto power over
promulgated rules which it may exercise at any time. See id. at § 22.004(b). Dean Newton
supports the view that the phrase "laws of the state" should not be read to mean legislative
enactments but compliance with the Rule-Making Act. See Newton & Wicker, PersonalJurisdiction and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 557-58
(1986)(changes focus from conflict between rule and existing statute to compliance with section 22.004 of Government Code). Texas Supreme Court decisions that hold a statute has
priority when in conflict with a rule, reflect a broader reading of the phrase "not inconsistent
with the laws of the state" embracing any legislative enactment. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v.
Hurst, 484 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1972)(civil rule 4 enlarging substantive rights of plaintiff to
extend statute of limitations inconsistent with article 5526 and must fall); Few v. Charter Oak
Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. 1971)(mandatory joinder provision of civil rule 39
inconsistent with article 4621 and 4626 allowing permissive joinder of husband and must yield
to statute); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Beasley, 106 Tex. 160, 177, 155 S.W. 183, 187
(1913)(supreme court cannot set aside statute by court rule). While the supreme court has
narrowed its holding in the conflict situation to "conflicts between civil rules and 'substantive
law'," subsequent courts of appeal have recited the broad language of Few without consideration whether the statute before the court was "substantive." Newton & Wicker, PersonalJurisdictionand the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 55859 (1986). Compare Kirkpatrick 484 S.W.2d at 589 (rule 4 cannot be read to enlarge time
period of plaintiff to file suit) with Few, 463 S.W.2d at 425 (rule 39 passed pursuant to supreme
court's rule-making power limited by constitution so that when court rules conflict with statutes rules must yield). See also C.E. Dukes Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228,
232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(reciting broad language of
Few without examining if statute substantive); Crickmer v. King, 507 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(permissive joinder statute conflicted with
mandatory language of rule 39 causing rule to fall under language of Few without examination
if statute was substantive). The Few decision itself may be criticized on two other grounds.
See Few, 463 S.W.2d at 425 (court rule yields to legislative statute when two conflict). First,
though the statute in question was passed subsequent to the promulgation of rule 39
(mandatory joinder of parties), the statute made no mention of repealing or disapproving rule
39 as required by the Rule Making Act. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon
1988)(recodification of civil statute 173 l(a)(2) stating that court rules and amendments remain
in effect until legislature disapproves them). Second, the legislature had expressly withdrawn
from the procedural rule-making field 33 years before this decision rendering the act's procedural significance a nullity. See Bar Ass'n of Dallas v. Hexter Title & Abstract Co., 175
S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1943)(passage of rule-making act evidences
legislature's will to relinquish rule-making power to supreme court), aff'd, 142 Tex. 506, 179
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ture and judiciary, if no legislative action is taken after the court issues its
repealing order, the court rule prevails.20 2 In this scenario, no conflict between the two branches exists because it may be implied that the legislature
approves of the court action.2 °3 Should the legislature act subsequent to a

repealing order of the supreme court, however, the statute disapproving the
court rule would control. 2°
On close examination, the apparent conflict currently existing between
rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 20 5 and chapter 9 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code 20 6 reveals no conflict at all. First, the legislature has not acted subsequent to the promulgation of rule 13 and the repealing order to disapprove the court's action. 2 7 Second, the legislature's
enactment of chapter 9 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is a nullity
because the legislature has vested the supreme court with the full rule-making power of the state.20 The legislature's role is not to draft rules of proce-

S.W.2d 946 (1944); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court has
full rule-making power in civil procedure and practice).
202. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(supreme court rules and
amendments effective until legislature disapproves them); H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER,
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL xxi (2d ed. 1988)(judicial rule prevails when legislature
fails to act following supreme court's repealer accompanying promulgated rule).
203. See Few, 463 S.W.2d at 425-26 (statute enacted after effective date of court rule
places rule in conflict with statute and rule must yield); Bar Ass'n of Dallas, 175 S.W.2d at 113
(as check on court's rule-making power legislature reserved right to disapprove proposed court
rule); H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL xxi (legislative

inaction subsequent to court promulgated rule with repealer allows rule to prevail).
204. See Few, 463 S.W.2d at 425-26 (subsequently enacted legislative statute supercedes
promulgated court rule); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(court rules remain effective until disapproved by legislature); H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL xxi-xxii (2d ed. 1988)(legislative action after court rule has
priority over rule in conflict scenario).
205. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (effect of signing pleadings, motions and other papers;
sanctions).
206. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001 - .014 (Vernon 1988)(sanctions
for frivolous pleadings and claims).
207. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(court rule and amendments
remain effective until disapproved by legislature); see also H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER,
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL xxi (2d ed. 1988)(inaction by legislative after court
passes rule and repealer allows rule not statute to prevail).
208. See Garrett v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas, 140 Tex. 394, 397-98, 168 S.W.2d
636, 638 (1943)(Rule Making Act confers upon supreme court all power over civil procedure,
relinquishing legislature's role in area); Bar Ass'n of Dallas v. Hexter Title & Abstract Co., 175
S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943)(legislature relinquished all power to
supreme court over procedural rule-making), aff'd, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a),(c) (Vernon 1988)(full rule-making power rests in
supreme court over practice and procedure in civil actions). This scenario properly places
responsibility for rule-making power in the judiciary so that the court may maintain its integrity as a co-equal governmental branch. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and
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dure for the courts.2 09 Rather, the legislature's only role is to disapprove
court rules enacted pursuant to the Rule Making Act.21 ° While the legislature presently has the final word in Texas as to the viability of a procedural
rule promulgated by the supreme court, the legislature has never utilized its
power to disapprove a statute.2 11
Should the legislature at some future date repeal the Rule Making Act,
only then would it become viable for the supreme court to consider proclaiming its procedural independence.2 12 The most acceptable theory for the
Texas Supreme Court to follow would be one based on inherent power. 2 13 It

the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15
N.M.L. REV. 407, 463 (1985)(judiciary must have ultimate responsibility for rule-making to
function as co-equal branch of government). But see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 73 (5th ed. 1971)(courts do not have

full rule-making power if legislature can disapprove court rules).
209. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(legislature's role to disapprove or veto rules considered unwarranted or inconsistent). But see Meshell v. State, 739
S.W.2d 246, 278-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(Miler, J., dissenting)(legislature empowered by
constitution to make procedural laws used in Texas courts); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(c) (legislature may delegate to supreme court power to promulgate other rules raising inference that
legislature has constitutional power to promulgate rules). The latter interpretation, if effective,
would make the power of the judicial branch subject to the whim of the legislature. See
Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 255 (permitting legislature to provide procedural rules without existence of underlying "right" gives unlimited power to legislature to infringe on judiciary's substantive power); Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(per
curiam)(legislature's ability to alter final judgments of court under facade of procedural enactment subjects judiciary to whim of legislature).
210. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(b) (Vernon 1988)(legislature may only disapprove procedural rules).
211. See id. (former article 1731(a) shows no instance of legislative disapproval of
promulgated rules since inception of Rule Making Act).
212. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(a)(b) (supreme court alone responsible for judicial
administration and promulgation of rules of civil procedure and practice). Until the legislature
does repeal the Rule Making Act, the court has no need to declare its procedural independence
from any branch of government. See id. This follows from the fact that the court currently
has the duty to initiate and supervise the rule-making process, subject only to legislative veto,
which has yet to occur. See id.; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a),(c) (Vernon
1988)(to ensure full rule-making power of supreme court may repeal inconsistent statutes or
rules conflicting with enactments).
213. See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 534 (June 22,
1988)(Spears, J., concurring)(Texas courts have inherent power to preserve efficient functioning of judicial branch as separate branch of government); Eichelburger v. Eichelburger, 582
S.W.2d 395, 397-400 (Tex. 1979)(inherent power of court derived not from legislative grant or
constitutional provision but from fact court constitutionally created and charged to perform
specific responsibilities and duties). Although the supreme court has utilized its inherent
power for various purposes, promulgation of its inherent power over rule-making would seem
to conflict with article V, section 3 1(c) of the Texas Constitution which could be construed to
allow the legislature a constitutional grant of authority to promulgate rules. See TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 31(c) (legislature may delegate to supreme court power to promulgate other rules
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is within this scenario that the independent nature of the Texas judiciary,2 14

accountable elected judges,2 15 and a strong tradition of separation of powers 2 1 6 would support the judiciary's action so it may administer justice and
preserve its independence and integrity 217 as the Texas Constitution

proscribed by law or constitution subject to limitations prescribed by law); Calvert, Jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court in Divorce Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1981)(criticizing supreme court's use of inherent/implied power to find jurisdiction in divorce cases). On

closer analysis, however, article V, section 31(c) restricts the use of whatever implied or
residual rule-making power the legislature would have. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 1(c) (legis-

lature may delegate to supreme court further power to promulgate rules legislature may create). Instead of finding an implied or direct constitutional grant of power in the legislature to
create or promulgate rules in section 31(c), the plain language shows the legislature can only
delegate to the supreme court the authority to create rules. Without the aid of the RuleMaking Act, article V, section 31 is open to three possible constructions when its language is
examined. First, one could find that the legislature now has power to create rules from section
31(c) and pass a limitation and/or procedure granting unto itself the power to promulgate
those rules. See id. (legislative act creating power in itself to promulgate rules of court would
be "law of the state" which supreme court could not override). Second, the legislature could
pass a procedure or limitation that it may solely or jointly promulgate rules of procedure based
on section 31(c) thus limiting the courts power over rule-making since the legislative act would
be a "law of the state" the court is subject to in its promulgation of rules. See id.
§ 3 l(a),(b),(c) (supreme court shall promulgate procedural and administrative rules not inconsistent with the laws of this state). Third, in conjunction with the mandatory provisions of
section 31(a) and (b) which place an affirmative duty on the supreme court to control and
promulgate rules, the legislature may request the supreme court to pass specific rules under the
court's rule-making power. See id. at § 3 1(c) (legislature may delegate to supreme court power
to promulgate other rules proposed or recommended by law). The third interpretation is more
reasonable when section 31 is read as a whole and harmonizes without conflict a seemingly
contradictory provision. Id.
214. See Ex ParteTowles, 48 Tex. 413, 439 (1877)(framers intended to create complete
judicial system not subject to legislative change); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, interp. commentary
(Vernon 1955)(judicial power vested in constitutional courts which legislature may not destroy
or restrict).
215. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (election of judges provides another check in separation
of powers by guaranteeing executive branch cannot overly influence judiciary).
216. See Houston Tap Ry. Co. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317, 335-36 (1859)(article II, section
1 intends each branch of government to be competent to execute constitutional duties without
interference or aid from employees of another branch); Lytle v. Halff, 75 Tex. 128, 131-32, 12
S.W. 610, 611 (1889)(three departments of government shall co-exist without restricting or
encroaching on each other). But see Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making,
30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 9 (1978)(separation of powers doctrine requires each branch to work
together in promulgating rules since each branch cannot hermetically be sealed from the
other).
217. See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974)(invasion of judiciary's power
forces court to find statute unconstitutional because acquiescence to gradual invasion of judicial power by legislature renders judiciary no more than judicial staff of legislature); Meshell v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(en banc)(allowing legislature to infringe on
judicial power under guise of procedural rules renders separation of powers meaningless);
Eichelburger v. Eichelburger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. 1979)(inherent judicial powers are
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demands.
B.

Shared Responsibility

The Texas system of shared responsibility in procedural rule-making maximizes the talents of both the legislature and judiciary.2 18 The judiciary, as
the initiator in the rule-making process, can utilize its experience and ability
to quickly adapt to the changing needs of the courts and bar.21 9 The legislature retains its role as supervisor of the rule-making process and can effectuate policy decisions by its power to disapprove rules that encroach on the
legislative function22 ° thus avoiding problems encountered in other states. 221
Realizing the procedural and substantive entanglement rule-making can entail, there exists in the Texas system a practical compromise between the
court and legislature, allowing both to work together in resolving difficulties
instead of forcing a constitutional confrontation.22 2 In the past, for example,
those which are called upon to preserve judiciary's independence and integrity); Browde &
Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The
Needfor PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 463 (1985)(final responsibility over rulemaking must rest with judiciary if judiciary to function as co-equal governmental branch).
218. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 413 (N.J.)(advantages of judicial rule-making include formation by experts, interpretation by sympathetic judges and rapid response
when change is needed), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative
Control Over JudicialRulemaking: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 38 (1958)(virtue of court rule-making is flexibility and immediate responsiveness to existing
problems); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 78 (1978)(advantages of judicial and legislative rule-making). Judge Pope considers the judiciary's rule-making talents to include efficiency in changing and correcting rules, immunity from
political pressures, judicial expertise as opposed to educating legislators on the rule-making
process, prompt attention to procedural change as opposed to busy and infrequent legislative
sessions, and the ease of amending existing rules. Id. The best talents of the legislature in the
rule-making process include closer scrutiny of rules and legislative review so as not to impinge
on substantive rights of litigants. Id.
219. See Pound, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926)(judicial regulation over rules ensures simple effective procedure shaped by expertise).
220. See Gallant, JudicialRule-Making Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 476 (1985)(review of court rules ensures rules will not
diminish or compromise substantive rights); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule
Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 8 (1978)(entanglement of substance and procedure inextricably intertwined in procedural rules demands legislature and court to reach accommodation in
procedural rule-making); Spitzer, Court Rule-Making in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 31, 66 (1982)(legislative review checks court power in rule-making).
221. See, e.g., Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978)(statute changing substantive rights of litigants in use of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice disputes interpreted
as violating court rule-making power); State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 614 (N.J. 1977)(pretrial intervention program created by court to allow defendants to avoid trial by successful
probation period upheld as constitutional use of court rule-making power despite abridging
state's substantive right to prosecute).
222. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil ProcedureRule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5,
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both branches have worked to simplify the system of special charges.22 3
While the court planned to streamline submission of issues, the legislature
simultaneously considered enacting a comparative negligence system. 224
The proposed Senate Bill contained numerous statutory requirements for
special issues which the court sought to avoid in its simplification process.225
Instead of confrontation, the senate sponsors were successful in conferring
with the supreme court to amend rule 277 to simplify the charge on a comparative negligence issue, accomplishing the objectives of both branches.2 26
The system works well, and it would only cause heightened tensions between
the legislature and judiciary to change it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current need for examining the court's role in Texas rule-making results from a conflicting court rule and statute on frivolous pleadings. In
Texas, two viable alternatives are available concerning the rule-making process. The first holds that when a statute and court rule conflict, the statute
controls. The second view changes the focus of the inquiry from confrontation to compliance with the Rule Making Act. According to the second
view, when the procedural requirements are met legislative review is superfluous. Should the issue be pushed to a constitutional confrontation, the
supreme court would likely resolve the issue in its own favor rendering to
itself exclusive non-reviewable rule-making power. The unique elements of
an independent judiciary, elected judges and a strong separation of powers
has shaped, the history of Texas rule-making and would support the
13-14 (1978)(complexity and intertwining of substance and procedure demands courts and
legislature to accommodate individual interests to create rules of procedure). Until 1978,
Judge Pope characterized Texas rule-making as exemplifying a "middle ground" not subject to
judicial or legislative dominance. Id. at 9.
223. See id. at 14 (court desired to simplify practice that compelled submitting issues
separately and distinctly while legislature's creation of comparative negligence statute required
submission of special issues comparing all parties negligence in suit).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. But see Meyers, The Door is Open - Revised Rule 277, 8 TRIAL LAW. F. 3, 4
(July-Sept. 1973)(Senate pressured supreme court to promulgate rules of procedure regarding
special issues on comparative negligence). Judge Meyers notes the senate did adopt that portion of House Bill 88 making Texas a comparative negligence state but did not adopt that part
of HB 88 that involved special issue submission. Id. Instead, the Senate passed resolution 49
that respectfully called upon the Supreme Court "to promulgate rules governing the manner of
submission of special issues relating to comparative negligence and the other related matters
contained in House Bill 88..." Id. Judge Meyers concludes that the court's change of Rule
277 should be seen in light of this coercive background. Id.; see also O'Quinn, More on Rule
277, 8 TRIAL LAW F. 3, 3 (Oct.-Dec. 1973)(legislature adopted comparative negligence and
would have erased special issue system by legislation but for Supreme Court's promise to
change rules avoiding legislative infringement on rule-making authority).
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187

supreme court in the constitutional confrontation scenario. While there are
positive and negative elements to both judicial and legislative promulgation
of rules, the model of shared responsibility which is currently viable in Texas
is preferred. The shared responsibility model encompasses the best elements
of both views and protects judicial and legislative interests. So long as the
legislature and judiciary are open to communication, the results stemming
from rule-making in Texas should continue to benefit the public by procedures designed to swiftly and fairly allow the substantive rights of litigants to
be heard.
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